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I. PREFACE 
What does an old-school financial printer (one from the bygone era 
of ink and printing presses) have in common with a present-day Internet 
billionaire (one more often seen on ESPN than CNBC)?  Both were 
accused by the government of “insider trading.”  While the former 
defeated the charges brought against him in a case which began the 
Supreme Court’s modern interpretation of federal insider trading laws, 
the latter recently suffered a setback at the appellate level in the form of 
a remand to the district court. 
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By now, legal professionals have likely discerned that the first 
scenario refers to the seminal 1980 United States Supreme Court case 
Chiarella v. United States.1  Sports fans and legal scholars alike 
probably recognize the second scenario as describing SEC v. Cuban,2
Federal securities laws broadly proscribe the employment of 
fraudulent or deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities in the public markets.
 a 
case brought against the flamboyant owner of the Dallas Mavericks 
professional basketball team, which was first dismissed by the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Texas and subsequently 
reinstated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.  The disparate outcomes 
reached in Chiarella and Cuban clearly reflect the difficulty the federal 
courts have encountered in formulating a consistent method of 
interpreting federal insider trading laws. 
3  “Insider trading” is a species of 
such malfeasance and occurs when one uses material, nonpublic 
information to profit in the trading of stock.4
Parts II and III of this Article provide an exposition of the statutory 
underpinnings of insider trading and a description of the fundamentals of 
federal securities laws.  Parts IV through VII then trace the development 
of modern insider trading jurisprudence, starting with the Supreme 
Court’s inaugural holding in Chiarella and then moving across three 
decades of evolving precedent to the recent Cuban decision.  Part VIII 
provides the authors’ analysis and commentary on the current state of 
insider trading laws.  The Article concludes in Part IX with some 
observations as to what the future holds for the law of insider trading.  
  The titular “evolution” of 
the law of insider trading has been spawned by a series of contrasting 
legal decisions and an abundance of interesting twists and turns. 
 
II. INTRODUCTION 
Insider trading has always captured the public’s attention (not to 
mention the watchful eye of the Department of Justice and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)).  In recent decades, we have 
 
 1. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 2. 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, 621 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 3. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 4. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997). 
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witnessed such episodes as the Ivan Boesky/Michael Milken scandal5 
and the “Yuppie Five” prosecutions.6 These occurrences were so 
engrossing that they gave rise to a myriad of exposés, cinematic epics7, 
and other fictional works depicting stories of Wall Street gone wrong.  
Even when insider trading was not the actual charge alleged, such as in 
the Martha Stewart prosecution,8
Recent episodes lend credence to the adage that, “the more things 
change, the more they stay the same.”  Current events detail charges of 
insider trading at well-known hedge funds,
 the mere hint of subterfuge involving 
confidential corporate secrets had the effect of setting the world on its 
ear. 
9 illegal tips obtained from an 
employee inside the behemoth Microsoft Corporation,10 and even a 
secretary at the Walt Disney Company being arrested for allegedly 
leaking confidential tips about the House of Mouse’s stock.11
 
 5. See JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1992). Stewart, a Pulitzer Prize 
winning journalist and former Wall Street Journal reporter, chronicles the insider 
trading investigation that brought about the demise of “Junk Bond King” Michael 
Milken and the storied investment house Drexel Burnham Lambert. 
  Therefore, 
it came as no surprise when notoriety immediately attached to the SEC’s 
filing of charges against Mark Cuban, a well-known business mogul and 
sportsman, for allegedly trading on material, nonpublic information 
 6. See Kurt Eichenwald, Two Firms Charged As Insiders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 
1986, at D1. The titular malefactors, including a young corporate attorney at a 
renowned New York City law firm, “trad[ed] on inside information about corporate 
takeovers that they had learned in the course of their jobs.” Id. See also Tony Robinson, 
Last of Yuppie 5 Pleads Guilty of Insider Trading, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1986, at F1. 
 7. See, e.g., WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987). 
 8. As discussed later in Part III-B, Stewart was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 
for the distinct, albeit somewhat related offense of lying to federal agents, but was never 
charged with insider trading. See United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 9. See David Glovin, Raj Rajaratnam’s Bid to Exclude Wiretaps Aims to Sink 
Galleon Insider Case, BLOOMBERG (May 11, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2010-05-10/raj-rajaratnam-s-bid-to-exclude-wiretaps-aims-to-sink-galleon-insider-
case.html (covering the Government’s insider trading charges against the hedge fund 
Galleon Group LLC’s senior executives, including founder Raj Rajaratnam). 
 10. See David Scheer & Jesse Westbrook, Samberg Pay $28 Million to End 
Insider-Trading Probe, BLOOMBERG (May 27, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2010-05-27/pequot-chief-samberg-to-pay-28-million-to-settle-sec-insider-trade-
probe.html. 
 11. Edvard Pettersson & David Glovin, Disney Assistant Accused of Plot to Sell 
Insider Data Wins Bail, BLOOMBERG (May 27, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2010-05-26/fbi-arrests-2-for-trying-to-sell-disney-earnings-info.html. 
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regarding a technology company in which he held a major investment 
stake.12
 
 
III. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF SECTION 10(B) 
Having established the high profile of insider trading cases, we now 
turn to the first crucial step in our analysis of modern insider training 
jurisprudence – an exposition of the well-established foundation for 
brining such cases under our federal securities laws.  We will begin with 
an examination of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.13
A. THE STATUTE AND THE RULE 
 
The birth of federal securities laws in this country traces its roots to 
the Great Depression and the reforms passed in reaction thereto.  The 
federal statutes were intentionally designed to rectify shortcomings in 
common law protections against fraud by establishing higher standards 
of conduct in the securities industry,14 although they were not intended 
to replicate common law maxims, such as the law of fiduciaries.15   The 
Supreme Court has long held that the overarching purpose of the federal 
securities laws is to remedy the proven inadequacies of common law 
protections in order to ensure the fair and honest functioning of an 
impersonal stock market.16
 
 12. Press Release, SEC, SEC Files Insider Trading Charges Against Mark Cuban 
(Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-273.htm. The 
cause of action for insider trading, which comprises just three paragraphs, is remarkable 
for its brevity. See Complaint at 1-2, SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 
2009) (No. 3-09CV2050-D), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/ 
2008/comp20810.pdf. 
 
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 14. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (“[A]n 
important purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies 
in the available common-law protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in 
the securities industry.”). 
 15. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1977). 
 16. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 
511 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1994) (stating that the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 “embrace a fundamental purpose . . . to substitute a philosophy 
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The Securities Exchange Act of 193417(“Exchange Act”) and its 
predecessor, the Securities Act of 1933,18 are the twin pillars of the same 
comprehensive federal scheme of regulating the stock markets.  The 
Exchange Act established the Securities and Exchange Commission to 
administer the federal securities laws.19  The SEC is empowered to 
investigate any violations of the federal securities laws, rules or 
regulations, as well as to seek monetary penalties for such 
transgressions.20  Of all the antifraud provisions found in the federal 
securities laws and the Exchange Act in particular, Section 10(b)21 is 
“[t]he quintessential statute . . . .”22
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the 
mails, . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors.
  Our analysis will, therefore, focus 
on that section which provides in relevant part that: 
23
It is axiomatic that the preservation of the integrity of the stock 
market has been an animating purpose of Section 10(b) since its passage 
over seventy years ago.
 
24
As previously indicated, Section 10(b) authorizes the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to promulgate rules and regulations to enforce 
the statute.  The relevant rule promulgated under Section 10(b), which is 
universally known as Rule 10b-5,
 
25
 
of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 “is an extended version of the 
prohibitions enacted in title 15, and is used both in conjunction and 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et. seq. (2006) [hereinafter the “Exchange Act” or the “1934 
Act”]. 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et. seq. (2006) [hereinafter the “Securities Act” or the “1933 
Act”]. 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 78d. 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 78u. 
 21. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 22. Anthony Sabino, The New Uniform Statute of Limitations for Federal 
Securities Fraud Actions: Its Evolution, Its Impact, and A Call for Reform, 19 PEPP. L. 
REV. 485, 487 (1992) [hereinafter Sabino, Uniform Statute of Limitations]. 
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 24. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 821 (2002). 
 25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
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interchangeably with the statutory provision.”26
Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful: 
 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact . . . , or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.27
Because Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under Section 10(b), it “‘does 
not extend beyond conduct encompassed by Section 10(b)’s 
prohibition.’”
 
28  Thus, “[t]he scope of Rule 10b-5 is coextensive with the 
coverage of Section 10(b).”29  To be certain, “Section 10(b) does not 
incorporate common-law fraud into federal law.”30
By enacting Section 10(b), “Congress meant to prohibit the full 
range of ingenious devices that might be used to manipulate securities 
prices.”
 
31  Rule 10b-5 was likewise designed to protect investors from 
manipulative devices and frauds foisted upon the stock exchanges by 
unscrupulous parties.32
 
 26. Sabino, Uniform Statute of Limitations, supra note 22, at 487. It is “securities 
law convention” to refer to the statute as Section 10(b) and the parallel rule as Rule 
10b-5. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 
372, 378 n.3 (5th Cir. 2007). Stemming from the meltdown of Enron, the instant 
litigation dealt with a class action brought over what was commonly known as Enron’s 
“Nigerian Barge Transaction.” Id. at 377. 
  It should be noted that both the statute and its 
accompanying rule have been acknowledged as having deep roots in 
 27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 28. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010) (citing United 
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997)). Accord Regents, 482 F.3d at 390 (“[T]he 
rule may not be broader than the statute.”). See also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S 148, 157 (2008). 
 29. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 816 n.1. See also SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 444 
(1st Cir. 2010) (“It is not the judiciary’s proper province to rewrite an administrative 
rule to sweep more broadly than its language permits. Thus, we must honor the 
limitations that the drafters deliberately built into Rule 10b-5.”). 
 30. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 162 (citing Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820). 
 31. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977). 
 32. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1988). 
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common law notions of fraud and deceit.33  Thus, in reviewing 
adjudications under Section 10(b), the Supreme Court has explicitly 
“retained familiar legal principles as [its] guideposts.”34  Paramount 
among those is the principle that a purported violation must contain an 
element of scienter, an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.35
In sum,  
 
[S]ection 10(b) was designed with the intent to cut a wide swath 
through all manner of insidious devices that might be used to 
perpetrate fraud upon the securities marketplace. Ground[ed] in 
timeless principles of fraud and deceit, the antifraud statute has kept 
those common law traditions as guideposts, while still ranging for 
beyond their historical boundaries.36
In the realm of securities litigation, Rule 10b-5 and its parent 
Section 10(b) are paramount.
 
37  This explains the Court’s demonstrated 
desire to define the boundaries of Section 10(b) liability with great care. 
In fact, the Supreme Court has consistently emphasized adherence to the 
statutory language in defining the scope of conduct prohibited by the 
statute.38
 
 33. See id. at 253 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
  Relevant to the instant discussion is the Court’s clear 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.7 (1976). See also 
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007). 
 36. Sabino, Uniform Statute of Limitations, supra note 22, at 488. 
 37. The growth of private causes of action brought pursuant to Rule 10b-5 has been 
astonishing, to say the least. As then-Justice Rehnquist declared, private Rule 10b-5 
actions are “a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.” 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).  In creating an 
implied private cause of action under Rule 10b-5, the courts “have also defined its 
contours.” Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881 n.5. The existence of a private cause of action 
under Section 10 “has been consistently recognized” for more than sixty years, and the 
fact of its existence “is simply beyond peradventure.” Herman & MacLean v. 
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) . At least one court has postulated that Rule 10b-
5 is based upon the policy that honest investors have a justifiable expectation that all 
market participants should trade on impersonal exchanges and enjoy relatively equal 
access to market data. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 
1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). Yet, the Court has always been circumspect 
in apportioning Section 10(b) liability because it “presents a danger of vexatiousness 
different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general.” Cent. 
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 189 
(1994) (citing Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 739) (internal citations omitted). 
 38. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173 (citations omitted). 
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declaration that “the text of the statute controls [its] decision”39
Historically, the Supreme Court has exhibited primary concern for 
both the scope of conduct prohibited by Section 10(b) and how that 
scope is defined by the Court’s decisions.
 
whenever defining the boundaries of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
liability. 
40  Rigorous adherence to the 
text of Section 10(b) has been the hallmark of the Court’s jurisprudence 
on the subject.41  The Court has made it abundantly clear that “conduct 
not prohibited by the text of the statute” cannot be challenged under 
Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.42  As stated by Justice Scalia in the recent 
landmark case Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.: “[T]o ask what 
conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits . . . .”43  
The Court classifies such an inquiry as a “merits question.”44  In 
Morrison, the Court essentially reiterates the proposition originally 
stated in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, that “when it comes to the scope of the conduct prohibited by 
Rule 10b-5 and § 10(b), the text of the statute controls . . . .”45  To be 
sure, Section 10(b) punishes only deceptive conduct “in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security . . . .”46  The Court has held that the 
phrase “in connection with” found in Section 10(b) means “to coincide” 
with the purchase or sale of a security.47
In sharp contrast, we note Justice’s Scalia’s admonition that 
“Section 10(b) . . . punishes not all acts of deception . . . . Not deception 
alone, but deception with respect to certain purchases or sales is 
 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 172. 
 41. Id. at 173, 174, 188 (citations omitted). 
 42. Id. at 173. 
 43. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (emphasis in 
original). Put another way, not every common law fraud that involves stocks or bonds 
violates Rule 10b-5. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002). 
 44. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
 45. Id. at 2881 (citing Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173) (internal citations omitted). 
The federal courts have been forced to grapple with the “scant legislative history” the 
New Deal-era Congress bestowed upon Section 10(b). See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224, 257 (1988). (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
 46. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2887 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)); see also Zandford, 
535 U.S. at 820. 
 47. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 824; see also SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 
2009). 
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necessary for a violation of the statute.”48  According to Justice Scalia, 
the transacting of shares on a national exchange is “the object[] of the 
statute’s solicitude [and] . . . it is parties or prospective parties to those 
transactions that the statute seeks to ‘protect.’”49
It has been long established that both statute and rule are to be 
accorded their plain meaning.
 
50  The statutory language is particularly 
relevant because “[t]he scope of Rule 10b-5 is coextensive with the 
coverage of § 10(b)” to such an extent that even the Supreme Court 
“use[s] § 10(b) to refer to both the statutory provision and the Rule.”51
 
 48. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2887 (emphasis in original). 
  
In that regard, the Court has long held that the usage of the words 
“manipulative” or “deceptive” in the text of the provision strongly 
suggest that Section 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or 
 49. Id. at 2884 (citing Superintendant of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 
404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (internal quotations omitted)). See also Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). Morrison worked a sea change in federal 
securities law by barring the application of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to 
“misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.” Morrison, 535 
U.S. at 2875. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia sounded the death knell for the so-
called “conduct” and “effects” tests, which permitted the extraterritorial application of 
Rule 10b-5 when there was sufficient conduct within U.S. borders in connection with 
the transacting of securities, even if those securities were listed on a foreign exchange, 
and the purchase or sale of such securities had effects upon American stock exchanges 
or companies. Id. at 2879, 2888. Compare id., with Anthony Michael Sabino, “Big 
Eight” Beware: Multinational Accounting Firms and the Increasing Scope of Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction Under the Federal Securities Laws, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 467, 
473-80 (1989) (analyzing the “conduct” and “effects” tests propounded by the Second 
Circuit) [hereinafter Sabino, “Big Eight” Beware]. See also Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 
475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining the “conduct” and “effects” tests and applying the 
former to find that Rule 10b-5 did not apply to stock transactions which included both 
U.S. and foreign participants). 
 50. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 472 (interpreting Rule 10b-5 according to the 
“commonly accepted meaning” of its words). See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197 
(stating that the text of Section 10(b), its authorizing statute, also must be examined). 
See also Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The starting point 
in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.”); see also Pinter 
v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 653 (1988) (“The ascertainment of congressional intent with 
respect to the scope of liability created by a particular section of the Securities Act must 
rest primarily on the language of that section.”). 
 51. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 816 n.1; see also  Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S 148, 157 (2008) (“Rule 10b-5 encompasses only 
conduct already prohibited by § 10(b).”). 
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intentional misconduct.52  Moreover, the Court in Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder rejected the notion that Section 10(b) encompasses mere 
negligence, since to do so would “add a gloss to the operative language 
of the statute quite different from its commonly accepted meaning.”53   
Significantly, the Court in Central Bank reiterated its “refus[al] to allow 
10b-5 challenges to conduct not prohibited by the text of the statute.”54
Thus, we have the foundation of our federal securities laws.  Nearly 
eighty years ago, the cornerstones of this foundation, the Securities Act 
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, were set in place.  
Since then, many other principles have been incorporated into this body 
of law and regulation.  Viewed as one great edifice, our federal 
securities laws have proven to be a durable and effective means of 
assuring the sanctity of the American capital markets by imposing a 
discipline of transparency, disclosure, and honesty.  Now that we have 
seen the pantheon as a whole, and are mindful of its overall dimensions, 
it is time to explore the precise chamber therein where the law of insider 
trading resides. 
 
 
 52. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197-99. 
 53. Id. at 199. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173-74; Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 
473 (confirming that the “language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant 
to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception.”). This, in turn, fits 
neatly with the Supreme Court’s emphasis upon scienter as the first among equals 
regarding the essential elements of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, as scienter is “a 
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst & Ernst, 425 
U.S. at 193; see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980);  Dura Pharm., Inc. v. 
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005) (stating that a Section 10(b) private action 
requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the 
defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) 
reliance; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation)). A violation may be found only 
where there is “intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors 
by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities.” Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 
199. The Fifth Circuit has postulated that in defining “deceptive,” as found in Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court has assiduously avoided the dictionary, 
instead relying exclusively upon case law to define the term. Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 389 (5th Cir. 2007). As 
stated by the Fifth Circuit, divining the common law meaning of a particular statutory 
text is “fruitless . . . where the Supreme Court has authoritatively construed the 
pertinent language . . . .” Id. 
 54. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 
164, 173 (1994) . 
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B. SECTION 10(B) AND INSIDER TRADING 
Above, we addressed the statutory underpinnings of our federal 
securities laws with a particular emphasis on Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.  Now it is time to begin the task of relating that law, and its 
parallel regulations, to the illegal conduct popularly denominated as 
insider trading. 
In its modern popular usage, “[i]nsider trading is a catchphrase used 
to describe a particular type of securities fraud - that which involves 
trading on material information that is unavailable to the marketplace.”55  
It is a great irony that “[n]o statute defines illegal insider trading.”56  To 
the contrary, even experts have characterized insider trading as “the 
amalgamation of judicial opinions that have developed in both the civil 
and criminal context.”57
While the bulk of our analysis is forthcoming, it is our initial 
intention to briefly present some of the facets of insider trading. We 
begin by introducing what has been known for decades as the “classical” 
theory of insider trading.  In United States v. Cusimano,
 
58 the Second 
Circuit distinguished the “classical” or “traditional” theory of insider 
trading as a wrong perpetrated by a corporate insider who exploits 
confidential information for individual profit.59  United States v. 
Nacchio60 presents a modern example of “classical” insider trading by a 
high level corporate insider.  In that case, the former CEO of 
telecommunications giant Qwest Communications was convicted of 
insider trading for transacting in the corporation’s stock on the basis of 
material, nonpublic information.61
“Classical” insider trading is not always defined by a single act of 
 
 
 55. Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, The Evolving Mystery of Illegal Insider 
Trading, 8/3/2010 N.Y. L.J. 7 (col 5). 
 56. Id. at 3. 
 57. Id. 
 58. 123 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 59. Id. at 87. 
 60. 573 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 61. Id. For another example, see Joshua Gallu & Jesse Westbrook, Alaska Air CEO 
Ayer Said to Face SEC Hedge-Fund Trading Probe, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 8, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-07/alaska-air-chief-hedge-fund-said-to-be-
subjects-of-insider-trading-probe.html (describing an SEC investigation into whether 
the CEO of Alaska Air Group Inc., who was also on the board of Puget Energy Inc., 
shared information about an upcoming buyout of the utility company with a New York-
based hedge fund operator). 
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malfeasance.  In certain instances, the insider repeatedly shares 
knowledge of corporate secrets and profits with an individual outside the 
corporation, known as the “tippee.”  A “tippee” is one who receives 
confidential information from a corporate insider.62  A prime example of 
such conspiratorial behavior is found in United States v. McDermott,63 
where a prominent Wall Street investment banker tipped off his 
paramour and was subsequently convicted for insider trading.64
Not every “inside” relationship or tip constitutes a violation of 
Section 10(b).  Consider, for example, the case of United States v. 
Chestman.
 
65  Chestman was the stockbroker for the husband of the 
granddaughter of the owners of Walbaum, Inc., a publicly traded 
company that owned a large supermarket chain.66  The granddaughter’s 
husband tipped off Chestman that Walbaum was going to be taken over 
at a premium price by rival supermarket chain A&P.  Chestman 
purchased Walbaum stock prior to the takeover and saw his investment 
double after A&P announced the buyout.67  After Chestman was tried 
and convicted of insider trading under Rule 10b-5 at the district court 
level,68 the Second Circuit reversed, holding that Chestman could not 
have breached a fiduciary duty because the husband from whom he 
received the tip did not owe a fiduciary duty to Walbaum.69
 
 62. The term entered the lexicon possibly for the first time in Chiarella v. United 
States. 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980). See also Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 230 (2d Cir. 1974) (“[T]his case involves the 
liability of non-trading ‘tippers’ and trading ‘tippees’ under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5.”). 
  Chestman is 
intriguing because it demonstrates that even a familial relationship, 
though normally perceived to be confidential in nature, may not be 
 63. 245 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 64. Id. at 138-39.  The case garnered headline attention since McDermott’s female 
friend went by the stage name “Marilyn Star” in the adult entertainment world. 
 65. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
 66. Id. at 555. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 556. 
 69. Id. at 570-71. See also SEC v. Rorech, 673 F. Supp. 2d 217, 226-27 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (“Courts have found that the existence of a duty of confidentiality turns on the 
nature of the relationship between the tipper and the source and not formal agreements . 
. . . The breach of that duty also does not turn on whether the information was 
voluntarily given or wrongfully taken . . . .”). Chestman’s convictions for trading on 
inside information in violation of Williams Act tender offer rules were upheld. United 
States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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enough to create a fiduciary duty as contemplated by Section 10(b). 
Chestman clearly has given prosecutors pause. The government 
certainly comprehends the risks inherent in any Rule 10b-5 prosecution 
and is mindful of how those risks increase with the celebrity status of the 
accused. 
For instance, in charging business magnate Martha Stewart with 
obstruction of justice and lying to investigators about her trading in the 
stock of ImClone Systems, Inc., the government deliberately chose not 
to take the risk of alleging that Stewart had engaged in trading on 
material, nonpublic information.70  Yet, the non-accusation brought 
about a firestorm of controversy at trial, where each side sought to take 
advantage of the glaring omission of a Rule 10b-5 charge of insider 
trading.71  Stewart was granted relief to avoid juror speculation that she 
had attempted to manipulate the stock of her own company, Martha 
Stewart Living Omnimedia, by allegedly deceiving her shareholders as 
to her involvement in the ImClone scandal.72
The emerging counterpoint to the “classical” theory of insider 
trading is the theory of insider trading by means of “misappropriation.” 
While we have much to say about the development of that doctrine, at 
this point it is sufficient to broadly define the misappropriation theory as 
the wrongful taking and exploitation of confidential information in order 
to profit in the buying and selling of stock.
 
73
 
 70. See United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 280 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 
 71. Id. at 308-311, 319-20 (affirming Stewart’s convictions for conspiracy, 
concealing material information from and making false statements to government 
officials, and obstructing agency proceedings). See United States v. Stewart, 323 F. 
Supp. 2d 606; see also United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 72. See Stewart, 433 F.3d at 308-9; see also Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 376. The 
decisions of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals are particularly important in defining 
the scope of the federal securities laws, especially insider trading, because “[a]s stated 
by the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit is truly the matriarch of the foremost 
jurisprudence in this field and therefore due deference must be accorded to its central 
rulings.” Sabino, “Big Eight” Beware, supra note 49, at 473 (citing Blue Chip Stamps, 
421 U.S. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (the Second Circuit “is regarded as the 
‘Mother Court’ in this area of the law.”)). Historically, the Second Circuit “has taken 
the lead” in adjudicating federal securities law matters, “since [its] jurisdiction includes 
the steel canyons of Wall Street, the ancestral home of the securities industry.” Anthony 
Michael Sabino, Awarding Punitive Damages In Securities Industry Arbitration: 
Working For A Just Result, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 33, 40 (1992). The Supreme Court 
continues to acknowledge the preeminence of the Second Circuit in the field of 
securities law. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010). 
 73. For a modern example of the “misappropriation” theory of insider trading, see 
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 A noteworthy case involving the misappropriation theory is SEC 
v. Cherif.74  After losing his job at a Chicago bank, Cherif forged 
credentials to obtain access to his ex-employer’s confidential investment 
banking files and subsequently traded on the stolen information.75  
Castigating the defendant as more than a “mere thief,” the Seventh 
Circuit classified Cherif’s wrongdoing as fraudulent because he deprived 
his former employer of something of value by his chicanery.76
Misappropriation of inside information, which is the underlying 
offense of insider trading, takes many forms.  In United States v. 
Falcone,
  Cherif is 
generally regarded as marking the Seventh Circuit’s adoption of the 
misappropriation theory of insider trading. 
77 the so-called “Business Week” case, the defendant’s 
stockbroker acquaintance acquired the contents of an issue of Business 
Week magazine from an employee of the publication prior to its public 
release.78  The conspirators then utilized information in the popular 
“Inside Wall Street” column to purchase stocks before the magazine’s 
official release date in violation of the policy of strict confidentiality that 
Business Week imposed on its vendors.79  The case is best known for the 
Second Circuit’s reliance on the “in connection with” requirement of 
Section 10(b).80
In SEC v. Dorozhko,
 
81 the defendant fraudulently obtained material, 
nonpublic information by hacking into a corporate computer system and 
reaped profits by trading on that information.82  The Second Circuit held 
that a breach of fiduciary duty was not required for computer hacking to 
be “deceptive” within the meaning of Section 10(b).83
 
Mark Hamblett, Ex-Ropes & Gray Lawyer Settles SEC Civil Charges, 7/8/2010 N.Y. 
L.J. 1 (col. 1) (describing a case in which several attorneys were criminally charged 
with insider trading, and one of the charged attorneys pled guilty to accessing 
confidential client information on a high-tech corporate takeover and selling 
information to a Wall Street trader.). 
  In so holding, the 
 74. 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 75. Id. at 406-07. 
 76. Id. at 412. 
 77. 257 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 78. Id. at 227. 
 79. Id. at 227-28. 
 80. Id. at 233-34. 
 81. 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 82. Id. at 44-45. 
 83. Id. at 49-51. 
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Second Circuit declared that “deceit” equals “fraud” within the context 
of Rule 10b-5 cases.84
The previously discussed cases highlight some of the more 
interesting touchstones of insider trading law.  And what punishments 
has Congress established for violations of Section 10(b)?  Specifically, 
the SEC is authorized to impose civil penalties for insider trading by 
bringing an action in a federal district court.
 
85  To prevent the “unfair 
use of [inside] information,” corporate directors, officers, and certain 
shareholders must disgorge any short term profits made by transacting in 
the company’s stock to the corporation, “irrespective of any intention.”86  
Congress occasionally enlarges the sanctions for insider trading, but has 
essentially left the operative law (Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5) 
untouched.87  There are non-judicial sanctions as well.88
While not landing squarely within our discussion here, we 
nevertheless note that the sweeping reforms instituted by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002
 
89 (passed in the aftermath of the Enron and other 
concurrent scandals) added some significant weapons to the prosecutor’s 
arsenal to combat insider trading. Principally, Section 807 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,90
 
 84. Id. at 50-51. 
 which is codified at Section 1348 of Title 18, 
imposes criminal liability on anyone who “knowingly executes, or 
attempts to execute . . . [a fraud upon] any person in connection with . . . 
any security” or employs fraudulent means to obtain “any money or 
 85. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(A). 
 86. 15 U.S.C. § 78p. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (codifying a private right of action 
against insider trading by those who contemporaneously purchase securities of the same 
class). 
 87. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 185 (“Congress has not reenacted the language 
of §10(b) since 1934.”). See also id. at 183 (citing the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) and noting the expansion of civil 
penalties for insider trading violations), and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988). 
 88. See Rosenthal v. N.Y. Univ., No. 08 Civ. 5338, 2010 WL 3564975 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 13, 2010) (upholding a university’s decision to deny an MBA degree to a student 
who had plead guilty and was imprisoned on a charge of conspiracy to commit 
securities fraud. The student in that case, a CPA then employed at the “Big Four” 
accounting firm Pricewaterhouse Coopers, had tipped off his brother, an attorney, with 
inside information about a pending acquisition of a publicly traded company).  
 89. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified at 11, 15, 18, 29 and 29 
U.S.C.). 
 90. Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 1102, 116 Stat. 745, 807 (2002) (to be codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1348). 
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property in connection with the purchase or sale of . . . any security . . . 
.”91
Section 1348 has been used by the government in at least one high-
profile case to prosecute insider trading.  In United States v. Mahaffy,
 
92 
stockbrokers and day traders were charged with securities fraud when 
the former permitted the latter to gain a trading advantage by listening to 
broadcasts made over the internal speaker system (or “squawk boxes”) 
at the brokers’ firms.93  It has been suggested that the reach of Section 
1348 extends further than that of Section 10(b) because it prohibits fraud 
“‘in connection’” with a security, whereas Section 10(b) prohibits fraud 
in connection with the “‘purchase or sale of a security.”94  The statute 
imposes a harsh sentence of up to twenty-five years of imprisonment for 
anyone convicted of committing such a fraud.95
We have now explored the foundation of our federal securities 
laws.  Paramount among these statutes and rules are Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.  We have defined insider trading and introduced several 
illustrative examples.  Yet, all of this is prelude.  The evolution of the 
law of insider trading is indeed a complex and fascinating subject, and 
we shall now undertake an examination of both its history and the 
current controversy surrounding it. 
 
 
IV. CHIARELLA: THE BEGINNING 
Every legal epic begins somewhere.  It cannot be disputed that, in 
the realm of insider trading, the beginning is found in Chiarella v. 
United States.96  In that case, defendant Vincent Chiarella handled 
documents for Pandick Press, a Wall Street financial printer.  In the era 
prior to PDFs and e-mail attachments, firms such as Pandick literally 
printed copies of prospectuses and other offering documents for stock 
deals and corporate takeovers.97
 
 91. Id. at §§ 1-2. 
  In the mid-1970s, Chiarella’s job was 
 92. No. 05-CR-613, 2006 WL 2224518 (E.D.N.Y. Aug., 2, 2006). 
 93. Morvillo & Anello, supra note 55, at 3 (col. 3). 
 94. Id. 
 95. 18 U.S.C. § 1348(2) (2006). 
 96. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 222 (1980). 
 97. Neophyte associates from large, corporate law firms would spend all night at 
the printers proofreading such documents. 
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to “mark up” such documents in preparation for the final printing and 
dissemination of materials when the offers became public.98
Needless to say, the secrecy of the identities of the corporations 
involved in any transaction was an important issue, however it was 
handled in a most rudimentary way – blank spaces were left or fictitious 
names were substituted for the real names of the acquiring and target 
companies.
 
99  The true corporate names were inserted only on the night 
of the final printing when the New York exchanges were closed.100
Yet, such rudimentary precautions did not deter the intrepid Mr. 
Chiarella.  Taking the preliminary versions of the documents that were 
passing through his hands, Chiarella carefully compared the unique 
financial data in each of the documents to information already publicly 
available, and thereby deduced the identity of several acquiring and 
target entities.  With this bit of common sense sleuthing, he purchased 
stock in the target companies and sold it once the takeover was 
announced and after the share price naturally increased.  In a little more 
than a year, he made over $30,000 in profits.
  The 
documents would only “go public” in final form immediately prior to 
the opening of the markets, thus forestalling any premature attempt to 
trade on the information revealed therein.   
101
The SEC investigated Mr. Chiarella’s activities, and was less than 
pleased with what it found.
 
102  Chiarella entered into a consent decree 
with the Commission in which he agreed to return his profits to the 
sellers of the shares, was discharged from his job by Pandick Press, and 
was indicted on seventeen counts of violating Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.103  Chiarella was subsequently tried and convicted of violating 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and his conviction was affirmed by the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.104
 
 98. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224. 
  But the story did not end there, for 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. This sum is measured in 1970s dollars. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 224-25. What portended immortality for Chiarella was, as the Supreme 
Court recognized, the fact that the case presented the first time that criminal liability 
had been imposed for a Section 10(b) nondisclosure. Id. at 235 n.20. Chiarella was 
sentenced to one year in prison (all except one month was suspended) and five years of 
probation. Id. 
 104. Id. at 225. For the Second Circuit’s opinion, see United States v. Chiarella, 588 
F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978). 
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the Supreme Court made what some still consider a startling reversal.105
Writing for the Court, Justice Lewis Powell framed the central 
question as “whether a person who learns from the confidential 
documents of one corporation that it is planning an attempt to secure 
control of a second corporation violates § 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 if he fails to disclose the impending takeover 
before trading in the target company’s securities.”
 
106  As could be 
expected, Justice Powell found that the Court’s inquiry properly 
commenced with an analysis of the statutory text.107  Specifically, 
Justice Powell wrote that Section 10(b) does not state whether silence in 
itself may constitute a prohibited manipulative or deceptive device.108  
To be sure, Section 10(b) was designed to broadly ban all fraudulent 
practices, but neither its text nor its legislative history affords genuine 
guidance on this issue.109
The Chiarella Court acknowledged that SEC administrative 
decisions do play an important role in the development of Section 10(b) 
jurisprudence.
 
110  In Cady, Roberts & Co.,111 for example, the 
Commission “held that a broker-dealer and his firm violated [Section 
10(b)] by selling securities on the basis of undisclosed information 
obtained from a director of the issuer corporation who was also a 
registered representative of the brokerage firm.”112  The Commission’s 
decision was an early enunciation of its “disclose-or-abstain” rule, under 
which “a corporate insider must abstain from trading in the shares of his 
corporation unless he has first disclosed all material information known 
to him.”113  Such a duty arises in the first instance because the material 
information is obtained “by virtue of [the insider’s] position.”114
The Chiarella Court further added that a failure to disclose material 
 
 
 105. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 225. 
 106. Id. at 224. 
 107. Id. at 226 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.185, 185, 187 (1976)). 
 108. Id. at 226. 
 109. Id. (citing Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 202, 206). 
 110. Id. at 226-7 (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)). 
 111. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 907. 
 112. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226 (citing Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 907). 
 113. Id. at 227 (citing Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 907). 
 114. Id. (citing Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911). The Chiarella Court found nothing 
novel in this obligation to disclose, finding it rooted in the common law. For instance, 
the Court commented on the long-held notion that a misrepresentation made for the 
purpose of inducing reliance constitutes fraud. Id. at 227-8. 
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information is fraudulent only when there is a duty to do so, and that 
“the duty to disclose arises when one party has information that the other 
[party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation 
of trust and confidence between them.”115  The Court also identified 
cases in which violations of Section 10(b) had been found, such as when 
corporate insiders used confidential information for their own benefit116 
and where bank agents, acting as fiduciaries, betrayed the trust invested 
in them by deliberately not disclosing to sellers the existence of a more 
favorable market.117  The Court ultimately concluded that both 
administrative and judicial interpretations of Section 10(b) had 
established that “silence in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities may operate as a fraud . . . despite the absence of statutory 
language or legislative history specifically addressing the legality of 
nondisclosure.”118
Applying these standards, the Court in Chiarella concluded that the 
defendant was not a corporate insider because “he received no 
confidential information from the target company.”
 
119  In addition, the 
so-called “market information” upon which he relied did not pertain to 
the target company’s revenue or strategies, “but only [to] the plans of 
the acquiring company.”120  Therefore, Chiarella’s use of that financial 
data “was not a fraud under § 10(b) unless he was subject to an 
affirmative duty to disclose it before trading.”121  The Court noted that 
the jury charge failed to make that distinction.  Quite to the contrary, the 
trial judge’s instructions effectively imposed upon Chiarella a duty to 
disclose to all sellers.122
 
 115. Id. at 228 (internal citations omitted). 
 
 116. Id. at 229 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 833 (2d Cir. 
1968)). 
 117. Id. at 229-30 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 
152-53 (1972)). See also SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (finding that 
caveat emptor in the stock markets is abolished by the Securities Act and the Exchange 
Act). 
 118. Id. at 230. 
 119. Id. at 231. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. Cf. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 
482 F.3d 372, 389 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that a device is not “deceptive” under 
Section 10(b) unless it involves a breach of some duty of candid disclosure). 
 122. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231. The appellate court, in affirming Chiarella’s 
conviction, also failed to identify the duty, if any, that Chiarella owed to sellers. Id. at 
231-32. 
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After noting this deficiency in the lower courts’ analyses, the Court 
announced its ratio decendi for the ultimate reversal of Chiarella’s 
conviction.  Writing for the Court, Justice Powell identified two 
paramount defects in the reasoning of the courts.  First, the lower courts 
failed to recognize that “not every instance of financial unfairness 
constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b).”123  Second, the lower 
courts erroneously determined that “the element required to make 
silence fraudulent [, namely,] a duty to disclose [,]”124 was present under 
the facts of the case.  A duty to disclose was necessary to transform 
Chiarella’s silence into a fraudulent act.  Here, no such duty could have 
arisen from Chiarella’s relationship with the sellers of the target 
company’s securities because he “had no prior dealings with them” and 
he was neither their agent nor fiduciary.125  In the Court’s view, 
Chiarella was merely a “complete stranger who dealt with the sellers 
only through impersonal market transactions.”126
The Court recognized that to affirm Chiarella’s conviction would be 
to proclaim that there exists a highly generalized duty between all 
buyers and sellers in the securities market to abstain from transacting 
upon material, nonpublic information.  The Court reasoned that such a 
proclamation would be problematic for two reasons.  One, it would mark 
a radical departure from the established principle that a duty only arises 
from a specific relationship between two parties.  Two, it would be 
erroneous to judicially manufacture such a duty “absent some explicit 
evidence of congressional intent.”
  The contrast drawn by 
the Court could not have been starker. 
127  As the Court correctly found, “no 
such evidence emerges from the language or legislative history of § 
10(b).”128
In addition, the Court pointed out that neither Congress nor the SEC 
 
 
 123. Id. at 232 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-77 (1977)). 
 124. Id. at 232. 
 125. Id. at 232-33. The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the appellate court’s 
postulation of a “regular access to market information” test, under which those who 
occupy strategic positions in the markets and routinely see nonpublic information are 
subject to a duty to disclose. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed that a relationship 
between the parties, and not mere access to information, gives rise to an affirmative 
duty. Id. at 231-32 n.14. 
 126. Id. at 232-33. 
 127. Id. at 233. 
 128. Id. 
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had ever adopted a “parity-of-information rule” in defining the scope of 
Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.129  To the contrary, Congress and the SEC 
have addressed the misuse of market information “by detailed and 
sophisticated regulation that recognizes when use of market information 
may not harm operation of the securities markets.”130  The lower courts 
in Chiarella, in contrast, imposed a new liability rule that swept too 
broadly and ignored the thoughtful balance struck by Congress and the 
Commission.  The Supreme Court ultimately found “no basis for 
applying such a new and different theory of liability . . . .”131
Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it 
catches must be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based upon 
nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak. We hold 
that a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere 
possession of nonpublic market information. The contrary result is 
without support in the legislative history of § 10(b) and would be 
inconsistent with the careful plan that Congress has enacted for 
regulation of the securities markets.
  The Court 
expressed the heart of its analysis as follows: 
132
 With that, Vincent Chiarella was a free man, the federal 
government suffered a stunning reversal of fortune, and a great 
cornerstone of the law of insider trading was set in place.
 
133
 
 129. Id. 
 
 130. Id. To demonstrate this point, the Court gave two examples. First, the Court 
noted that the Williams Act “limits but does not completely prohibit a tender offeror’s 
purchases of target corporation stock before public announcement of the offer.” Id. at 
233-34 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976 Supp. II)). Second, the Court described the 
practice of “warehousing,” wherein an acquirer gives advance notice to institutional 
investors of its intention to take over a target, and the investors then accumulate the 
target’s shares before the share price increases after announcement of the bid. Id. at 234 
(“[T]he theory upon which [Chiarella] was convicted is at odds with the Commission’s 
view of § 10(b) as applied to activity that has the same effect on sellers as [Chiarella’s] 
purchases. . . . In this case, as in warehousing, a buyer of securities purchases stock in a 
target corporation on the basis of market information which is unknown to the seller.”). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 234-35. 
 133. Parenthetically, we note that the Justices declined to decide the government’s 
alternate theory in support of Chiarella’s conviction – that he somehow violated a duty 
to the acquiring corporation by virtue of the fact that he was an employee of the printing 
company contracted by the acquirer. Since that theory was not presented to the jury, the 
Court would not speculate on its merits. Id. at 234-37. See also Rewis v. United States, 
401 U.S. 808, 814 (1971) (holding that a criminal conviction cannot be affirmed on the 
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Before departing Chiarella for an analysis of the next landmark 
case in the development of insider trading laws, a few additional words 
about Chief Justice Burger’s dissent are in order.134  Chief Justice 
Burger acknowledged the general rule that “neither party to an arm’s-
length business transaction has an obligation to disclose information to 
the other unless the parties stand in some confidential or fiduciary 
relation.”135  He argued in dissent, however, that the rule should be 
limited when an informational advantage is obtained by wrongful or 
unlawful means.136  In particular, he insisted that both Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 should be read “to encompass and build on th[e] principle . . 
. that anyone who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an 
absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading.”137
The Chief Justice contended that the broad language found in 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 (“any person engaged in any fraudulent 
scheme”) supported his interpretation.
 
138  The dissent further alleged that 
a contrary view would in essence require an application of different 
standards to “white collar” level insiders and “blue collar” level 
employees.139
Lastly, the Chief Justice proclaimed that his interpretation of the 
relevant law “would not threaten legitimate business practices” because 
the antifraud provisions would not impose a disclose-or-refrain 
requirement on market “specialists” in the performance of their 
 
 
basis of a theory not submitted to the jury). 
 134. First, however, we acknowledge the concurring opinions of Justices Stevens 
and Brennan. Justice Stevens agreed with the notion that identification of the duty 
allegedly breached must precede the imposition of civil or criminal liability, and 
likewise confirmed that the majority correctly declined to hear the alternative theory for 
the reason that it was never presented to the jury. He wrote separately to caution that the 
majority’s holding in no way “placed any stamp of approval on what” Chiarella did, 
implicitly leaving that issue for another day. Id. at 237-38 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
Similarly, Justice Brennan concurred with the proposition that the mere possession of 
nonpublic market information does not give rise to a duty to disclose. Yet, Justice 
Brennan also alluded to a day when the Court would be required to deliberate on a case 
containing a relevant jury instruction on liability premised upon an improper taking or 
conversion of nonpublic information for one’s own benefit. Id. at 238-39 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 135. Id. at 239-40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 136. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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everyday market functions.140  In an abrupt closing, the Chief Justice 
strongly condemned Chiarella, declaring that by his actions he, “stole to 
put it bluntly” and was guilty “beyond all doubt” of violating Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.141
While Chief Justice Burger’s dissent rightly anticipated the 
development of the misappropriation theory of “insider trading” 
liability, his application of that theory to the facts in Chiarella was 
misguided for several reasons.  First, the question of misappropriation 
was not explicitly before the Court.  Second, the Chief Justice’s reading 
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was overly expansive and, if adopted, 
would have expanded prosecutorial power beyond the level intended by 
Congress.  And lastly, the theory upon which the Chief Justice based 
Chiarella’s guilt was never presented to the jury.  In sum, while the 
dissent may have been helpful in setting the stage for the next iteration 
of this controversy, its unnecessary and inappropriate haste to reach that 
next landmark compels us to largely discount the dissent’s assertions.
 
142
And so we dispose of the Chiarella dissent, with the assurance that 
we will expound and apply the majority’s holding in due course.  That 
being said, we now proceed to the next key precedent in the evolution of 
insider trading jurisprudence. 
 
 
V. DIRKS: A TALE OF VINDICATION 
The central points of Chiarella were reiterated and tested in Dirks 
v. Securities and Exchange Commission.143
The facts of Dirks are unique.  In 1973, Raymond Dirks was an 
officer of a New York broker-dealer firm that specialized in providing 
investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional 
investors.
  As we will discuss later, 
that case represented the second consecutive major defeat for the 
government in its prosecution of insider trading. 
144
 
 140. Id. at 242-43 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
  In early 1973, Dirks was contacted by Ronald Secrist, a 
 141. Id. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 142. Justice Blackmun’s dissent, as joined by Justice Marshall, largely suffers from 
the same infirmities, particularly its expansive reading of Section 10(b) as a catchall for 
any supposed wrongdoing in the securities markets. Id. at 245-46 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
 143. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 144. Id. at 648. 
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former officer of Equity Funding of America, a diversified insurance 
and financial services company.  Secrist informed Dirks that the assets 
of Equity Funding were vastly overstated as a result of fraudulent 
corporate practices.145  Secrist claimed that he and other employees of 
Equity Funding had complained to various regulatory agencies, but the 
regulators failed to act on the charges.  Secrist urged Dirks to verify the 
fraud and disclose it to the public.146
On his own initiative, Dirks investigated the allegations, going so 
far as to travel to Los Angeles to interview several officers and 
employees of the corporation.
 
147  While the corporate managers denied 
any wrongdoing, Dirks managed to corroborate Secrist’s allegations 
through interviews with certain employees of the corporation.148
During the course of his two week investigation, Dirks informed a 
number of clients and investors of the burgeoning evidence of fraud at 
Equity Funding.
 
149  Although neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded 
in Equity Funding shares, some of the persons to whom Dirks provided 
information sold their holdings of Equity Funding securities, including 
five investment advisers whose liquidated holdings totaled more than 
$16 million.150
While the Wall Street Journal initially refused to print Dirks’ story 
for fear of subjecting itself to a libel claim, word of Dirks’ investigation 
spread like wildfire, and the price of Equity Funding’s stock soon 
cratered from $26 per share to less than $15 per share.
 
151  This implosion 
of the share price led the New York Stock Exchange to halt trading in 
Equity Funding stock.152  California insurance regulators subsequently 
impounded Equity Funding’s records and uncovered evidence of the 
fraud.153  The SEC filed charges against the firm and Equity Funding 
was immediately placed into receivership.154
The SEC then began an investigation into Dirks’ role in exposing 
 
 
 145. Id. at 649. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 649-50. 
 152. Id. at 650. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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the fraud.  After administrative court proceedings, the SEC found that 
Dirks “had aided and abetted violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act 
of 1933, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and SEC Rule 
10b-5, by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of the 
investment community who later sold their Equity Funding Stock.”155  In 
short, the SEC decreed that Dirks had engaged in insider trading.  In a 
surprising act of leniency, the SEC, in recognition of his key role in 
exposing the fraud, only censured Dirks.156
Unmoved by the SEC’s beneficence, Dirks sought judicial review 
in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
 
157  
Unfortunately for him, the District of Columbia Circuit entered 
judgment against Dirks based on the reasons stated in the Commission’s 
opinion.158  The Supreme Court recognized the importance of the issue 
to the SEC and the securities industry and granted certiorari.159  In a 
stunning reversal of fortune for the SEC, the Court overturned the lower 
court and found for Dirks.160
Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Lewis Powell (who, 
significantly, was also the author of Chiarella) first succinctly set forth 
the basis for Dirks’ conviction.  Specifically, Dirks had received 
material, nonpublic information from insiders at Equity Funding with 
whom he had no prior relationship and shared that information with 
certain investors who, in reliance upon these revelations, sold their 
Equity Funding shares.
 
161  According to the Court, “[t]he question [was] 
whether Dirks violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities 
laws by this disclosure.”162
Turning to its analysis, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the 
SEC has long recognized the common law principle that corporate 
 
 
 155. Id. at 650-51 (internal citations omitted). 
 156. Id. at 652. The irony of the SEC’s pursuit of Dirks cannot be understated, 
especially since it was his investigation that exposed one of the more notorious frauds 
perpetrated up to that date. Then again, the regulators’ repeated failures to uncover the 
fraud themselves might explain their reasons for punishing Dirks. 
 157. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (stating that “[a] person aggrieved by a final order 
of the Commission . . . may obtain review of the order in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the circuit in which he resides or has his principal place of business, or for 
the District of Columbia Circuit . . . .”). 
 158. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 652. 
 159. Id. (citing Dirks v. SEC, 459 U.S. 1014 (1982)). 
 160. Id. at 652. 
 161. Id. at 648. 
 162. Id. 
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insiders, particularly officers, directors, and controlling stockholders, are 
subject to an affirmative duty to disclose material information before 
dealing in their corporation’s securities.163  The Commission had long 
contended that a failure to disclose constitutes a Rule 10b-5 violation.  
Moreover, the Commission had found that the duty to “disclose or 
abstain” from trading could be rightfully extended to individuals other 
than corporate insiders.164
Notwithstanding the SEC’s belief set, the Dirks Court took this 
opportunity to reaffirm the crux of what it held in Chiarella – that 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are violated when access to confidential 
information is misused and covertly exploited for private gain.
 
165  
However, in the same breath, Dirks reinvigorated Chiarella’s maxim 
that “there is no general duty to disclose” and such an obligation cannot 
arise from the mere possession of material, nonpublic information.166  
The Dirks Court confirmed that “[s]uch a duty arises rather from the 
existence of a fiduciary relation.”167
Justice Powell further acknowledged that “[n]ot ‘all breaches of 
fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction []’ . . . come 
within the ambit of Rule 10b-5.”
 
168  Rather, a violation of the rule 
requires that there also be manipulation or deception.169  That axiom is 
applied to an insider trading case because of the inherent unfairness of 
using nonpublic corporate information for personal benefit.  On this 
issue, the Dirks Court emphasized that Rule 10b-5 liability turns on 
whether the insider refused to “go public” before trading on such 
information.170
The Dirks Court further emphasized that the Chiarella Court was 
“explicit . . . in saying that there can be no duty to disclose where the 
person who has traded on inside information” was not a fiduciary or 
agent.
 
171
 
 163. Id. at 653 (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961)). 
  The Court staunchly refused to depart from “the established 
doctrine that [a fiduciary] duty arises from a specific relationship 
 164. Id. at 653 (citing Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912). 
 165. Id. at 653-54. 
 166. Id. at 654 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980)). 
 167. Id. (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-35). 
 168. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977)). 
 169. Id. (citing Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 473). 
 170. Id. at 654. 
 171. Id. 
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between two parties[,]” by imposing a new, more generalized obligation 
on all market participants to disclose or abstain.172  Before proceeding, 
the Court tacitly acknowledged that “[t]his requirement of a specific 
relationship . . . has created analytical difficulties for the SEC and 
courts” in resolving allegations of insider trading.173
Apparently motivated to now resolve some of these analytical 
conundrums, the Court first noted the SEC’s argument that a “tippee” 
(one receiving inside information from a “tipper”) “inherits” the 
obligation to disclose to shareholders whenever he receives inside 
information from an insider.
 
174  The Court found the argument to be 
problematic and quickly disposed of this notion.175
Justice Powell exposed the SEC’s position as a view that “differ[ed] 
little from the view [the Court] rejected as inconsistent with 
congressional intent in Chiarella.”
 
176  The fatal flaw in the SEC’s 
rationale, both in Dirks and Chiarella, was that it “appear[ed] rooted in 
the idea that the antifraud provisions require equal information among 
all traders.”177  Such a view conflicted with the principle set forth in 
Chiarella “that only some persons, under some circumstances, will be 
barred from trading while in possession of material nonpublic 
information.”178  In a resounding reaffirmation of its earlier 
pronouncement, the Dirks Court declared that the duty to disclose arises 
not from “one’s ability to acquire information because of his position in 
the market,” but from “the relationship between the parties.”179
Furthermore, the Dirks Court elaborated upon the dangers of 
adopting a less principled view.  Specifically, the Court stated that 
“[i]mposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person 
knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and 
trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market 
 
 
 172. Id. at 654-55 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 173. Id. at 655. 
 174. Id. 
 175. The Court faulted the SEC for failing to explain “why the receipt of nonpublic 
information from an insider automatically carries with it [a] fiduciary duty of the 
insider.” Id. at 656 n.15. Again harkening back to Chiarella, the Court reemphasized 
that “only a specific relationship” gives rise to a duty to disclose or abstain. Id. 
 176. Id. at 656. 
 177. Id. at 657. 
 178. Id. The Dirks Court praised Judge Wright’s dissent at the circuit level for 
“correctly read[ing] our opinion in Chiarella as repudiating any notion that all traders 
must enjoy equal information before trading.” Id. 
 179. Id. (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1980)). 
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analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the 
preservation of a healthy market.”180  It is a given that in performing the 
vital role of compiling and disseminating material information about 
corporate securities, market analysts sometimes distribute notes or 
reports to favored clients and investors first.  The Court astutely 
observed that “such information cannot be made simultaneously 
available to all of the corporation’s stockholders or the public 
generally.”181
The Court further acknowledged that the conclusion “that recipients 
of insider information do not invariably acquire a duty to disclose or 
abstain does not mean that such tippees always are free to trade on the 
information.”
  Such an observation clearly refuted a centerpiece of the 
SEC’s flawed reasoning in Dirks. 
182  Rather, the Court recognized that “[t]he need for a ban 
on some tippee trading [was] clear” and certain limitations would be 
acceptable.183  For example, corporate insiders who are forbidden by a 
fiduciary duty to trade in their own securities, “may not give . . . 
information to an outsider for the same purpose of exploiting the 
information for their personal gain.”184
In clarifying the import of its holding, the Dirks Court declared that 
“some tippees must assume an insider’s duty to the shareholders not 
because they receive inside information, but rather because it has been 
made available to them improperly.”
 
185  Hence, the assumption of a 
fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain can take place only when the inside 
source of the confidential information has first breached his fiduciary 
duty to his constituency “and the tippee knows or should know that there 
has been a breach.”186  In conclusion, Dirks established that tipping is 
appropriately viewed only as an indirect violation of the securities laws, 
and is clearly predicated upon a certain sequence of violative acts.187
 
 180. Id. 
   
 181. Id. at 659. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b)). 
 185. Id. at 660. 
 186. Id. See also In re Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 651 (1971) (Smith, C., 
concurring) (stating that “tippee responsibility must be related back to insider 
responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee knew the information was given to 
him in breach of a duty by a person having a special relationship to the issuer not to 
disclose the information . . . .”). 
 187. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 661. 
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All that being said, Dirks counseled that in determining whether a 
tippee is under an obligation to disclose or abstain, a court must 
determine whether the transmittal of insider information constituted a 
fiduciary breach.188  In making this determination, the Court forewarned 
that “[a]ll disclosures of confidential corporate information are not 
inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders.”189
A highly influential factor in this analysis is the tipper’s reason for 
disclosing confidential information.  The key test is whether the 
disclosing insider benefited, either directly or indirectly, from revealing 
the information.  On this point, Justice Powell stated that “[a]bsent some 
personal gain, there [can be] no breach of duty to stockholders.  And 
absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.”
 
190  
Moreover, the Court rebuffed the SEC’s concerns that such a tight 
analysis might encourage, rather than deter, prohibited conduct.  Finding 
the regulators unduly concerned that they might have to read parties’ 
minds to divine improper intent, the Court found no such hindrance, 
stating that, “the initial inquiry is whether there has been a breach of 
duty by the insider.  This requires courts to focus on objective criteria . . 
. such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into 
future earnings.”191  Dirks clearly establishes that regulators and courts 
alike must base their allegations and decisions on “objective facts and 
circumstances . . . .”192
While resolving such questions of fact may be difficult, the Court 
nevertheless found it “essential . . . to have a guiding principle for those 
whose daily activities must be limited and instructed by the SEC’s 
inside-trading rules . . . .”
  Implicitly, occult powers to uncover scienter 
should not factor into the analysis. 
193  In this area of the law, such bright lines are 
first drawn by establishing a breach of fiduciary duty by the inside 
source.  In contrast, the rule adopted by the SEC in Dirks had “no 
limiting principle.”194
 
 188. Id. 
 
 189. Id. at 661-62. 
 190. Id. at 662. See also Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. at 648 (Smith, C., 
concurring) (stating that it is important “to focus on policing insiders and what they do . 
. . rather than on policing information per se and its possession . . . .”). 
 191. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663. 
 192. Id. at 664. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. Parenthetically, the Court was troubled by the SEC’s black and white view 
of potential insider liability, and apparently took exception to the regulators’ 
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Under its established insider trading and tipping rules, the Supreme 
Court found no actionable wrongdoing by Dirks.  The Court classified 
Dirks as “a stranger to Equity Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary 
duty to its shareholders.”195  The Court properly reminded that none of 
Dirks’ sources expected him to keep the information about Equity 
Funding confidential, “[n]or did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain 
the information about Equity Funding.”196  In the end, Dirks broke no 
law when he shared his information with investors and the Wall Street 
Journal.197  Ray Dirks prevailed, and the SEC went down in a bitter 
defeat.198
 
assumption that an insider “invariably violates a fiduciary duty” whenever he remits 
nonpublic information to an outside recipient. Id. at 666-67 n.27. Similarly, the Court 
voiced concerns that giving the SEC free rein to pursue Rule 10b-5 prosecutions as it 
sees fit “can be hazardous, as the facts of this case make plain.” Id. at 664 n.24. The 
rebuke to the Commission is painfully obvious. 
 
 195. Id. at 665. To be sure, the Justices were not cavalier in freeing Dirks from 
liability. The Court was careful to expound that “[w]e do not suggest that knowingly 
trading on inside information is ever socially desirable or . . . devoid of moral 
considerations.” Id. at 661 n.21 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 196. Id. at 665. 
 197. Id. at 666. In order to assure a fair presentation herein, we note that Justice 
Blackmun’s dissent paints a far different picture. The dissent asserts that Dirks carefully 
went about crafting the quality and quantity of information he shared and strategically 
offered that information to investors. For example, he imparted the more gruesome 
details of his investigation to select investors, mainly large investment houses. Id. at 
669-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent classified Dirks’ attempts to notify those 
outside his inner circle as “feeble, at best.” Id. at 670. Justice Blackmun focuses on the 
point that those who had received a more fulsome report from Dirks were able to 
offload nearly $15 million in Equity Funding shares before the stock price plummeted. 
Id. In sum, the dissent characterized Dirks as far from altruistic, and instead painted him 
as a self-serving opportunist. Be that as it may, this is where we find the Court’s 6-3 
decision to be particularly insightful, because it shows a convincing majority of the 
Justices would not subscribe to such a negative view of Dirks. To the contrary, the 
majority, at most, applauded Dirks’ civic mindedness, and, at least, characterized his 
underlying motivations as something less vile.  
 198. Id. at 667. In the interests of full disclosure, the senior author of this Article 
was interning for the SEC while Dirks was sub judice before the Supreme Court, and, in 
point of fact, was assigned to a unit pursuing Dirks administratively. While a matter of 
personal opinion by the writer, there is no question in his mind that the Commission 
wanted Ray Dirks very badly, and fought for his punishment with unrelenting vigor. 
Hence, the Supreme Court’s exoneration of Dirks was a bitter pill for the agency to 
swallow, and made even more ignominious because it followed so soon after the 
regulators’ loss in Chiarella. 
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In sum, Chiarella set the stage and Dirks added to the drama.199
 
   
The next act was to prove the resolution (at least in part) of the hitherto 
unresolved misappropriation theory branch of insider trading liability. 
VI.  O’HAGAN: THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY AT LAST 
Lawyers have long had the solemn duty of upholding the law.  Only 
in rare instances are members of the profession accused of actually 
breaking the law themselves.  Unfortunately, however, the landmark 
case of United States v. O’Hagan200
James Herman O’Hagan was a partner at the eminent law firm of 
Dorsey & Whitney, then based in Minneapolis, Minnesota.  In July of 
1988, Dorsey was retained as local counsel by Grand Metropolitan PLC 
(“Grand Met”), a U.K. food conglomerate, as part of its takeover bid for 
the Pillsbury Company, also headquartered in Minneapolis.  Although, 
“O’Hagan did no work on the Grand Met representation,”
 presents such a scenario. 
201
In mid-August of 1988, while Dorsey & Whitney was still actively 
 he 
nevertheless took a strong interest in the Grand Met acquisition – a 
financial interest, to be sure. 
 
 199. Parenthetically, we note Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), 
popularly known as the Wall Street Journal case. In that case, one R. Foster Winans 
was the writer of the venerable Journal’s “Heard on the Street” column, and he was 
convicted of illegally conspiring with others to profit on stock trades made in 
anticipation of news to be published when the Journal hit the newsstands each Monday 
morning. This matter came at a time before the advent of the Internet and the near 
instantaneous transmission of market information. The titular Carpenter was Winans’ 
roommate and co-conspirator. Id. at 20-24. In one of those rare instances, a recusal led 
the eight remaining Justices to split four to four on Carpenter’s Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 convictions, thereby affirming the decision below. Id. at 24. Carpenter therefore 
focused solely on affirming mail and wire fraud convictions, id. at 24-28, and, aside 
from the recitation of the underlying facts, not a word was said about Section 10(b). 
Relevant to this Article, in the proceedings below, the Second Circuit agreed that 
Winans “had knowingly breached a duty of confidentiality by misappropriating 
prepublication information” from his employer, and that the “deliberate breach” of his 
duties and his subsequent concealment from the Journal was a sufficient basis for his 
Section 10(b) conviction. Id. at 23-24. See also United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 
1024, 1031-32 (2d Cir. 1986). Hence, Carpenter, while somewhat significant for its 
notoriety, constitutes but a footnote in the instant discussion. 
 200. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 201. Id. at 647. Dorsey & Whitney withdrew from representing Grand Met in early 
September, barely two months into the engagement. Id. 
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representing Grand Met, O’Hagan purchased “call options” on Pillsbury 
stock.202  He continued to buy options throughout the remainder of that 
month and into September.  By the end of that time, O’Hagan had 
amassed some 2,500 Pillsbury options, “apparently more than any other 
individual investor,”203 in addition to buying some 5,000 shares of 
Pillsbury common stock.204  When on October 4, 1988, Grand Met 
publicly announced its bid to acquire the iconic “Pillsbury Dough Boy” 
and all the legendary brands associated with the Pillsbury Company, 
O’Hagan was richly rewarded for his investing foresight.  With Pillsbury 
common stock approximately doubling in price, O’Hagan sold off his 
investments and made a net profit of well over $4 million.205
O’Hagan’s newfound riches soon caught the eye of the SEC, 
prompting an investigation culminating in a fifty-seven count 
indictment. The SEC’s principal allegations were that O’Hagan had 
defrauded both his own law firm and its client, Grand Met, by diverting 
material, nonpublic information about the planned Pillsbury acquisition 
for his own gain.
 
206  Ultimately, O’Hagan was convicted on fifty-seven 
counts and sentenced to nearly three and a half years in prison.207  
Somewhat surprisingly, a divided panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed all of O’Hagan’s convictions, primarily on the ground 
that insider trading liability cannot be premised upon the 
misappropriation theory.208  Acknowledging that the “[d]ecisions of the 
Courts of Appeals are in conflict on the propriety of the 
misappropriation theory under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,” the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.209
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg set out the paramount 
questions before the Justices, first addressing the misappropriation 
theory of insider trading liability.  Justice Ginsburg asked whether a 
 
 
 202. Id. at 647-48. Each option gave O’Hagan the right to purchase 100 shares of 
Pillsbury at a fixed price at a later date. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 648. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 648-49. Interestingly, the indictment claimed O’Hagan’s motivation was 
to take his Pillsbury profits and cover up an earlier embezzlement of unrelated client 
funds. Id. at 648. 
 207. Id. at 649 
 208. Id.; United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 622 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 209. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 649 (1997). 
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person, trading in stock for personal profit, violates Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 when he utilizes confidential information misappropriated in 
a breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of that nonpublic data.210  
The O’Hagan Court replied in the affirmative211 and ultimately held that 
criminal liability for violating Section 10(b) “may be predicated on the 
misappropriation theory.”212
Initially, Justice Ginsburg conducted a neat review of the relevant 
statute.  Specifically, the Justice explained that Section 10 proscribes the 
use of “any deceptive device . . . in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities” and that, moreover, the text of the statute did not confine 
its ambit to the deception of a purchaser or seller alone; “rather, the 
statute reaches any deceptive device used ‘in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.’”
 
213  Continuing on to Rule 10b-5, the 
Court noted that the Rule’s broad sweep of liability was in turn 
delimited solely to the “conduct encompassed by [Section] 10(b)’s 
prohibition.”214
Turning next to analyze the competing schools of thought, Justice 
Ginsburg first exposited the “traditional” or “classical” theory, which is, 
in brief, when a corporate insider trades in the stock of his own 
corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information.  Moored to 
Chiarella, such conduct is wrongful because the employment of inside 
information qualifies as the “deceptive device” outlawed by Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
 
215
In contrast, the “misappropriation” theory holds accountable those 
who misappropriate confidential data and trade with that special 
knowledge, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information, 
and it is the violator’s “undisclosed, self serving use” of the information 
so gained which defrauds the source of its lawful exclusivity in 
possessing that knowledge.
 
216
 
 210. Id. at 647. 
  The misappropriation theory is “[i]n lieu” 
of premising liability upon a corporate insider pursuant to the classical 
 211. Id. at 648-649. 
 212. Id. at 650 (footnote omitted). 
 213. Id. at 650-51 (quotes in the original) (emphasis added). See also United States 
v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 214. Id. at 651 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976), Cent. 
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173 
(1994)). 
 215. Id. at 651-52. 
 216. Id. at 652. 
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theory, and instead, liability flows from the “trader’s deception of those 
who entrusted him with access to confidential information.”217
Reaching the gravamen of the O’Hagan Court’s reasoning, Justice 
Ginsburg next declared that “[t]he two theories are complementary, each 
addressing affects to capitalize on nonpublic information” in buying or 
selling stock.
 
218  While the classical theory zeroes in on a corporate 
insider’s breach of trust owed to shareholders, conversely, the 
misappropriation postulation “outlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic 
information by a corporate ‘outsider’” breaching a duty of 
confidentiality owed to the source of the information.219  In its own 
fashion, the latter theory is intended to safeguard the overall integrity of 
the marketplace from abusers with access to privileged information, yet 
who stand removed from the stockholder constituency (and, hence, owe 
them no fiduciary duty).220
Turning to the case at bar, the Justices expressed agreement with 
the government’s contention that trading upon misappropriated 
information fell within the conduct prohibited by Section 10(b).  Those 
proven to misappropriate “deal in deception” and pretend loyalty to their 
source “while secretly converting” its information for personal gain.
 
221  
Here, attorney O’Hagan’s deceit was “of the same species” as addressed 
by the Court in Carpenter v. United States,222 which analogized the 
fraudulent misappropriation there to a kind of embezzlement from the 
accuser’s employer.223
Returning to the centrality of O’Hagan, the Court found the pivot 
 
 
 217. Id. Indeed, could Justice Ginsburg’s use of the word “trader” be a Freudian-
esque homonym for “traitor,” given the law’s evident scorn for such duplicity?  
 218. Id. at 652. 
 219. Id. at 652-53. 
 220. Id. at 653. This was presaged by Dirks in a parenthetical where the Court 
forecasted that “[u]nder certain circumstances . . . where corporate information is 
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant,” a fiduciary 
breach may arise between those nominal outsiders and the shareholders they ostensibly 
serve. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983). Consonant with its earlier 
teachings, Dirks emphasized that it is not the acquisition of inside information that is 
determinative, but rather the underlying relationship granting access that gives rise to 
that duty. Id. 
 221. Id. at 653. 
 222. 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
 223. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997) (citing Carpenter v. United 
States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987)). 
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of the instant case was deception by nondisclosure, that is, the cover-up 
of the act of misappropriation.224  Furthermore, the misappropriation 
theory advanced by the prosecution is consistent with Court precedent 
holding that Section 10(b) “trains on conduct involving manipulation or 
deception.”225  Indeed, in sharp contradiction, the Court noted that full 
disclosure to the source, that the person in possession of the privileged 
information does intend to trade upon it, negates the deception, and thus 
forecloses Section 10(b) liability.226
Now turning briefly to the “in connection” with the buying or 
selling of a security portion of the statutory ban, the O’Hagan Court 
determined it is the secretive usage of the confidential information to 
purchase or sell securities that consummates the wrong, not the 
preceding capture of the closely held data.
 
227  “The securities transaction 
and the breach of duty thus coincide,” and, to be certain, it is the source 
that is the victim of the fraud.228
 Justice Ginsburg further opined upon another boundary of the 
misappropriation theory.  The theory targets inside information of a sort 
that the malefactor then utilizes to make “no risk profits through the 
purchase or sale of securities.”  Any other use of the information, and 
Section 10(b) is not implicated.
 
229
Hence, the law is not a catch-all for all misappropriation, but only 
deceitful misappropriations of information made where the goal is 
profiting from stock transactions.
 
230  Such conduct is antithetical to the 
maintenance of fair and honest securities markets, and “there is no 
question” such conduct falls within Section 10(b)’s prohibition that the 
fraud is in connection with buying or selling stock.231
 
 224. Id. at 654. 
 
 225. Id. at 655 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).  Justice 
Ginsburg added that the statute “is not an all purpose breach of fiduciary ban.” Id. at 
655. 
 226. Id. at 655. 
 227. Id. at 655-56. 
 228. Id. at 656. But see Id. at 680 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas disagreed that the misappropriation theory has 
the proper nexus to the “in connection” with the purchase or sale of a security 
requirement of section 10(b). Id. at 684-85. Accord id. at 679 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).  
 229. Id. at 656. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 657-58.  This line of reasoning was later followed by SEC v. Zandford, 
535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002). 
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Applying this logic to the accused here, the Court found “it makes 
scant sense to hold a lawyer like O’Hagan a [Section] 10(b) violator if 
he works for a law firm representing the target of a tender offer, but not 
if he works for a law firm representing the bidder.”232  The Court found 
the statutory text makes no distinctions.  Satisfying the elements, first of 
deceit, and then in connection with transacting in securities, brings 
misappropriation of this stripe within the law’s purview.233
Next, the O’Hagan Court expounded upon why the new precedent 
announced that day was an essential step in the evolution of its insider 
trading jurisprudence.  To be sure, the Court disabused the notion that 
Section 10(b) liability can stem exclusively from explicit duties to 
narrowly-identified purchasers or sellers of the securities in question.
 
234
First, differentiating the seminal holding in Chiarella, Justice 
Ginsburg clarified that a fiduciary duty to stockholders is not “the only 
relationship” giving rise to liability for insider trading.
 
235  Indeed, 
according to the Justice, “Chiarella thus expressly left open the 
misappropriation theory before us today.”236  The predecessor case of 
Dirks similarly “left room for application of the misappropriation theory 
in cases like [O’Hagan].”237  Justice Ginsburg characterized Dirks as 
clarifying Chiarella’s fundamental postulation that there is no 
generalized obligation between all market participants to refrain from all 
trading when in possession of as-of-yet nonpublic information.238  The 
O’Hagan Court highlighted the observation in Dirks that, in the latter 
case, there were no expectations that supposed confidences would be 
kept, nor was there any information in Dirks misappropriated or 
obtained in contravention of the law.239
In concluding this portion of its reasoning, the O’Hagan Court held 
that “the misappropriation theory . . . is both consistent with the statute 
 
 
 232. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 659. 
 233. Id. at 659. 
 234. Id. at 660. 
 235. Id. at 661 (emphasis in the original). 
 236. Id. at 662. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 663. 
 239. Id. O’Hagan quickly disposed of any supposed predominance of Central Bank, 
summarily pointing out that O’Hagan pertained to criminal liability pursuant to section 
10(b). Id. at 664. In contrast, Central Bank worked to confine the scope of private, civil 
litigation. Id. 
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and with our precedent.”  Setting forth some of the requisite elements of 
criminal liability under Rule 10b-5, O’Hagan declared that the 
prosecution must first prove a willful violation of the proviso, and next 
that the alleged violator knew of the prohibition.240
In the instant case, the Justices rejected O’Hagan’s contention that 
the misappropriation theory is too amorphous to impose criminal 
liability for the reason that the theory casts a wider net then merely 
ensnaring those who allegedly breach a recognized proscription.
 
241  
Thus, O’Hagan’s original convictions on the Section 10(b) violations 
were restored.242
In retrospect, O’Hagan is a grievous tale indeed – a guardian of the 
law violated the very oath he took to uphold those laws – and yet it 
served a very important purpose.  O’Hagan marked the first time the 
Supreme Court recognized and expounded upon the misappropriation 
theory of insider trading.  As we saw previously, the Court refrained 
from addressing this separate branch of the relevant law in both 
Chiarella and Dirks, as the issue was not yet ripe for adjudication.  
Notwithstanding whatever controversy that restraint might have 
engendered in the intervening years, patience did indeed prove to be a 
virtue. 
 
O’Hagan certainly provided the appropriate platform for the 
creation of a new and vital precedent for the misappropriation theory.  
With the issue firmly at hand, the Justices made clear that the time had 
come for recognition of the misappropriation theory as a critical part of 
the law of insider trading.  The Court made the key distinctions between 
the misappropriation school of reasoning and the classical theory camp, 
carefully and explicitly delineating what it is about misappropriation that 
makes it a violation of the law. The Court elaborated on the 
wrongfulness of taking the confidential data of another and utilizing it 
for personal gain in the transacting of securities, and how such 
infractions were to be dealt with in the future. 
With O’Hagan, the carefully built structure of prohibitions against 
 
 240. Id. at 664-65. 
 241. Id. at 665. While not explicitly stated, it is plausible that in this case O’Hagan’s 
status as a corporate attorney helped undo him. 
 242. Id. at 666. We leave for our readers’ edification the Court’s next and further 
ground for upholding O’Hagan’s conviction for violating section 14 rules regarding 
trading stock in connection with a tender offer. Id. at 666-677. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m, et 
seq., and 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e (commonly known as Rule 14e, promulgated under the 
Williams Act, regulating tender offers).  
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insider trading were complete, at least as to the leading theories for the 
prosecution of such wrongs.  We now see clearly how the classical and 
misappropriation theories complement each other, providing for a more 
comprehensive bulwark against such malfeasance.243
 
  Still the fidelity of 
the lower federal courts to these companion philosophies remains to be 
seen. We turn next to the latest case that presents precisely such an 
issue. 
VII .CUBAN: VICTORY, THEN DEFEAT, AND NOW UNCERTAINTY 
A. A CUBAN VICTORY 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Securities and 
Exchange Commission v. Cuban lays the latest foundation in insider 
trading jurisprudence.244
The essence of the courtroom drama, first argued before the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Texas was simple – charged 
with insider trading, Cuban was first able to win a dismissal, without 
prejudice to refiling, of the government’s case.
  Mark Cuban, the putative defendant, enjoyed a 
meteoric rise in the high-tech industry after founding Broadcast.com, a 
company he sold to Yahoo! Inc. in 1999 for an astonishing $4.7 billion.  
Notwithstanding his obvious business acumen, he is better known in 
professional sports circles as the outspoken team owner of the National 
Basketball Association’s Dallas Mavericks.  Nonetheless, it is the 
beginnings of his fortune as an IT entrepreneur that, to some extent, 
presaged the transactions which led him to his current legal notoriety. 
245
 
 243. We recommend looking at the quite comprehensive decision of the erudite 
Judge John G. Koeltl of New York’s Southern District in SEC v. Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 
2d 367 (2010) (“Rorech II”). The opinion’s 122 pages are a wonderful exposition of 
section 10(b), and cogently diagram its precedents. For now, we simply note that the 
government’s claims of insider trading with regard to credit-default swaps (the first 
time such instruments were the centerpiece of a section 10(b) prosecution) were 
completely dismissed by the veteran Judge Koeltl after a bench trial. Shades of 
Chiarella and Dirks indeed appear here. 
  The district court’s 
Cuban decision makes a fitting addition to our overall analysis of the 
law of insider trading in that it relies upon a rich tapestry of precedents, 
 244. SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009); SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 
551 (5th Cir. 2010).  
 245. Id. at 717. 
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yet still forges its own trail. 
To set the stage, as of March, 2004, Cuban was an investor in 
Mamma.com, a Canadian company that operated an internet search 
engine.  Cuban personally owned 600,000 shares, or a 6.3% stake, in the 
NASDAQ-traded company.  At about that time, the company’s 
management decided to raise capital via a PIPE offering.  “PIPE” stands 
for “Private Investment in a Public Entity” and refers to a private 
investor contributing capital by taking a significant stake in a 
corporation whose shares are publicly traded.246
Given that Cuban was Mamma.com’s largest then-known 
shareholder, the firm’s CEO contacted him by telephone.
 
247  The salient 
reason for the call was that the PIPE would necessitate the issuance of 
many more shares, thus diluting Cuban’s stake to a much lesser 
percentage of the corporation’s outstanding stock.248  According to the 
allegations, the CEO prefaced the call by telling Cuban he was about to 
share confidential information, and Cuban supposedly agreed to 
maintain its confidential nature.249  The corporate chief, purportedly 
relying upon that assurance of confidentiality, proceeded to tell Cuban 
about the PIPE offering.250  Cuban’s responded without favor. “Well, 
now I’m screwed,” was the alleged retort.251  Cuban angrily expressed 
his disdain for PIPE offerings, precisely because such maneuvers dilute 
the holdings of existing shareholders.252  At the end of the conversation 
with the CEO, Cuban allegedly declared “[Now] I can’t sell.”253
Some hours after that telephone conversation, the CEO followed up 
with an email to Cuban, providing contact information for the 
investment bank underwriting the PIPE.
 
254
 
 246. Id. 
  Cuban called the banker, and 
was supplied with additional, allegedly confidential, information about 
the stock offering which had yet to be announced.  The next sequence of 
 247. Id.  
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id.  
 252. Id.  
 253. Id. According to the internal company emails relied upon by the SEC in its 
complaint, Mamma.com anticipated Cuban’s negative reaction to the move, and its 
management apparently believed that Cuban would not sell his shares until after the 
official announcement of the PIPE offering. Id.  
 254. Id. 
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events represents the gravamen of the government’s complaint.255  
According to the SEC, “[o]ne minute after ending this call, Cuban 
telephoned his broker and directed the broker to sell all 600,000 of his 
Mamma.com shares.”256  After first selling but a handful of shares in 
after-hours trading, the broker was able to sell the vast bulk of Cuban’s 
holdings in Mamma.com during the next trading day.  Cuban did not 
inform the management of Mamma.com either of his intentions to sell or 
the eventual liquidation of his stake.257
After the market closed, on the day of Cuban’s sell-off, the 
company officially announced the PIPE offering.  Mamma.com’s share 
price began to decline at the opening the next day, and continued to drop 
in the trading days following.  All told, Cuban avoided in excess of 
$750,000 in losses by dumping his stake ahead of the news about the 
PIPE.
 
258
The Securities and Exchange Commission pounced on these largely 
undisputed facts.
 
259  The Commission alleged that Cuban violated the 
federal securities laws, specifically Rule 10b-5, under the 
“misappropriation” theory of insider trading.260  Cuban quickly moved 
to dismiss the regulators’ case.261
Chief District Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater succinctly posited the 
question before the court as to whether the SEC “adequately alleged that 
Cuban undertook a duty of non-use of information required to establish 
liability under the misappropriation theory.”  Concluding that the agency 
had failed in that regard, the court granted Cuban’s motion to dismiss, 
but expressly authorized the government to replead.
 
262
A few words about the procedural backdrop are helpful here.  Chief 
Judge Fitzwater commenced by invoking Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a)(2), which mandates that a pleading must, at a minimum, 
contain a short and plain statement of the claim demonstrating that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.
 
263
 
 255. Id. 
  Admittedly, detailed allegations of facts 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. To date, no criminal charges have been filed in this matter. 
 260. Id. at 717. 
 261. Id. at 718. 
 262. Id. at 717. 
 263. Id. at 719. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
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are not a prerequisite, but the pleading must recite more than mere labels 
and conclusions.264  It follows from this most basic rule of pleading that 
a complaint failing to pass this basic threshold cannot stand.  In such a 
situation, an opposing party may make a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which provides that a complaint or pleading will be 
dismissed upon motion when it fails to state a claim.265
As the Cuban decision reminds, a court deciding a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) motion must accept as true all well-pled 
facts, and view them in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion.
   
266  Notwithstanding such procedural leniency, the 
complainant must still set forth sufficient facts to set out a facially 
plausible claim,267 such that the court may reasonably infer that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.268  Notably, “plausibility” 
is not “probability,” which is obviously a more rigorous requirement.  
Rather, the wrongs alleged must be sufficiently undergirded by facts to 
raise the right to relief above rank speculation.269  That overall standard 
of pleading having been established, the court turned to the substantive 
law regulating the securities market.270
To start, the Chief Judge of the Northern District of Texas 
extensively quoted from both Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
 
271  The 
court correctly noted that the proscription against insider trading is not 
precisely statutory in origin, rather “it has instead developed through 
SEC and judicial interpretation of § 10(b)’s prohibition of ‘deceptive’ 
conduct and Rule 10b-5’s antifraud provisions.”272
Harkening back to Chiarella, the Cuban bench noted how the 
Supreme Court, in that case, first espoused the “traditional” or 
“classical” theory of insider trading liability.
 
273
 
 264. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)); Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Similarly, talismanic references to the mere 
elements of a cause of action will not suffice. Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 555. 
  That postulation was 
 265. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 266. SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 719 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
 267. Id. at 719 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
 268. Id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). 
 269. Id. at 719 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 
 270. Id. at 719-20. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 720. 
 273. Id. (quotations in the original). 
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amplified with the O’Hagan Court’s finding that the relevant section and 
rule is violated when a corporate insider trades in the stock of his 
corporation “on the basis of material, nonpublic information.”274  There, 
the liability springs from the relationship of trust and confidence 
between shareholders at large and the company’s insiders, the latter of 
whom have obtained closely-held information by reason of their 
standing within the corporation’s inner circle.275
Judge Fitzwater then analyzed the expansion of the classical theory, 
first found in Chiarella, with the Supreme Court’s ruling in O’Hagan, 
and that ruling’s underlying premise of the “misappropriation theory.”
  
276  
Closely hewing to the text of O’Hagan, the court acknowledged that 
misappropriation occurs when the transgressor commits fraud in 
connection with a securities transaction by confiscating confidential 
information in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information, 
and then utilizes that knowledge to trade the very stock of the 
corporation in question.277
The evil the law is aimed to punish, said Chief Judge Fitzwater, is 
the use of another’s confidential information in a secretive, selfish action 
to profit in the trading of stock.
 
278  In so doing, the wrongdoer breaches 
duties of loyalty and confidentiality, and defrauds the corporate entity of 
the exclusivity of the information wrongfully taken.279
The district court took care in noting that while the classical 
approach to insider trading is grounded upon a fiduciary relationship that 
is misused by the insider, the misappropriation theory, by comparison, 
turns more upon a deception perpetrated by a party entrusted with 
confidential information.
 
280  Relying upon the Supreme Court’s 
distinctions, the Cuban court recognized that these two theories 
complement each other in policing the stock markets.281
Turning to the case at bar, Chief Judge Fitzwater found that it was 
the theory of misappropriation that was “at the heart of the present case 
 
 
 274. Id. at 720 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997)). 
 275. Id. at 720 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)). 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 720 (citing O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 720 (citing O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652). 
 280. Id. at 720 (citing O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652). 
 281. Id. at 720 (citing O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-53). 
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and Cuban’s motion to dismiss.” 282  The core argument of the 
government was that Cuban was liable pursuant to the misappropriation 
theory because a duty was created by his supposed agreement to keep 
confidential the information provided by Mamma.com’s CEO.283  That 
duty was breached, alleged the agency, when Cuban sold his shares 
without informing the corporation of his intent to act upon the 
information he had been given.284
In bringing his motion to dismiss, Cuban argued that the SEC’s 
charges failed to establish the key element of deceptive conduct essential 
to a finding of liability under Rule 10b-5.
 
285  Cuban claimed that the 
bare allegation of a confidentiality agreement, without demonstrating the 
breach of a fiduciary relationship, is insufficient to establish wrongdoing 
under the misappropriation theory.  Furthermore, Cuban maintained that 
the existence, if any, of such a fiduciary relationship had to be measured 
by state law, and in that task the government had failed to meet its 
burden.286
Chief Judge Fitzwater first declared that his decision on Cuban’s 
arguments would turn upon the validity of the defendant’s contentions 
regarding misappropriation liability (to wit, that no liability could be 
imposed absent a fiduciary duty).  With that understanding, the district 
court made the resolution of that issue its first order of business.
 
287
Cuban argued that the determination of the existence of a fiduciary 
duty was exclusively a question of state law (in this instance, Texas 
law).  Indeed, the defendant called upon Chief Judge Fitzwater’s own 
unreported opinion from nearly twenty years prior, Southwest Realty, 
Ltd. v. Daseke,
 
288 in support of his contention.289
 
 282. Id. at 720-21. 
  Furthermore, Cuban 
asserted that if the trial court veered from this sole reliance upon state 
law, it would violate the general proposition against the creation of 
federal common law, even in the highly federalized realm of securities 
 283. Id. at 721. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. Cuban made additional arguments about the misapplication of subparts of 
Rule 10b-5 as against him, and that the Commission exceeding its rulemaking authority 
in promulgating certain of these provisions. Id. 
 287. Id. at 721. 
 288. No. CA3-89-3055-D, 1992 WL 373166, at *9-10 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 1992). 
 289. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 721. 
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regulation.290
The SEC’s opposing argument was that exclusive reliance upon 
state law to find a fiduciary duty sufficient to support misappropriation 
theory liability was unprecedented in prior federal court decisions.  
Further, the adoption of a state-by-state standard would “balkanize the 
misappropriation theory and lead to divergent outcomes,” driven by 
different underpinnings of state law, notwithstanding the clear policy of 
a national scheme of federal securities law.
 
291
Here, the court issued Cuban his first setback.  Chief Judge 
Fitzwater wholeheartedly rejected the defendant’s exclusivity 
contention.  The judge distinguished his 1992 decision as predating the 
Supreme Court’s postulation of the misappropriation theory, and, 
moreover, as not being made in the context of an insider trading case.
 
292  
His earlier decision thus distinguished, Chief Judge Fitzwater found that 
“the court had no occasion to hold that state law regarding fiduciary or 
similar relationships was the only source of a duty to support liability 
under this [misappropriation] theory.”293  To the contrary, the Chief 
Judge continued, although the source of an underlying fiduciary duty 
“can be found in state law,”294 — for example, the O’Hagan situation 
involving attorney-client confidentiality — “it may be located 
elsewhere,” and without running afoul of the general prohibition against 
creating general federal common law.295  Relating this further to the 
SEC’s rulemaking powers, the court also held that agency regulations 
promulgated pursuant to a Congressional grant of authority do not 
constitute federal common lawmaking.296
In the instant case, the district judge could therefore rely upon state 
contract law for creating the required fiduciary duty.  Thus, the eventual 
holding disapproved of the defendant’s contention that misappropriation 
theory liability could only spring from a preexisting fiduciary 
 
 
 290. Id. at 721 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-90 (1977)). 
 291. Id. at 721-22. 
 292. Id. at 722 (quoting Sw. Realty, 1992 WL 373166, at *10). Chief Judge 
Fitzwater clarified that his Southwest Realty decision opined upon the duty of disclosure 
being grounded in the state law of fiduciary duty, not sourced in federal securities law. 
Id. at 722 (quoting Sw. Realty, 1992 WL 373166, at *10). 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. (emphasis in the original). 
 295. Id. (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652-53 (1997)). 
 296. Id. 
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relationship.297
Next the bench turned to the crux of the case, addressing whether 
misappropriation liability can be based upon a legal duty arising via 
agreement, and if so, what such an agreement would need to be 
comprised of.
 
298  The Chief Judge first noted that the seminal holding in 
Chiarella turned upon finding the requisite element of deception only if 
there was an underlying duty of disclosure.299  According to the judge, 
such a duty is not general in nature, but rather must arise from a specific 
relationship between the relevant parties.300  Indeed, Chief Judge 
Fitzwater observed that Chiarella “unequivocally rejects a ‘parity-of-
information’ principle,” under which a disclosure duty would arise based 
on the mere possession of material, nonpublic information.301
As could be expected, Cuban concluded that in O’Hagan, like 
Chiarella, the Supreme Court incorporated the element of deception in 
formulating the misappropriation theory.
 
302  The three keys emphasized 
by the Justices in O’Hagan were: 1) that the material, nonpublic 
information belongs to the source; 2) that the wrongdoer breaches a duty 
to keep the source’s proprietary information confidential; and 3) that the 
wrongdoer seeks personal profit by this breach of trust.303  As now 
characterized by the district court, “[u]nder the misappropriation theory 
of insider trading, the deception flows from the undisclosed, duplicitous 
nature of the breach.”304  Chief Judge Fitzwater noted that “O’Hagan 
states unmistakably” that it is the duplicity via secrecy that is a central 
tenet of the misappropriation theory.  Conversely, liability thereunder 
does not attach if the transactor declares his intention to put the 
confidential information to use.  “[D]eception inheres in the undisclosed 
use of information,” concluded Fitzwater in Cuban.305
The district court drew from the foregoing the following conclusion 
of law: “trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information cannot 
be deceptive unless the trader is under a legal duty to refrain from 
 
 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at 722-23. 
 300. Id. at 723. 
 301. Id. (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980)). 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 724. 
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trading on or otherwise using it for personal benefit.”306  Certainly, a 
fiduciary relationship gives rise to such an obligation, observed Chief 
Judge Fitzwater.307
However, and of great import, the court had no difficulty in ruling 
that “a duty analogous” to a fiduciary duty can arise by agreement.  
Indeed, the Chief District Judge found this additional avenue fully 
comported with Chiarella’s instructions.
 
308  Notably, the court 
contended that this “confidentiality by agreement” might even reside on 
stronger grounds than confidentiality conceived in a fiduciary duty.  The 
latter “flows more generally from the nature of the parties’ relationship,” 
whereas the former is premised upon “terms created by [their] own 
agreement rather than triggered merely by operation of law.”309  But 
what kind of agreement could give rise to such a constraint upon a 
party’s ability to trade the stock he possesses material, nonpublic 
information about?  Chief Judge Fitzwater was explicit in finding that 
such an agreement “must consist of more than an express or implied 
promise merely to keep information confidential.”310  Specifically, the 
Cuban opinion declared that the agreement must impose a legal duty to 
refrain from trading or otherwise acting for personal gain upon the 
recipient of the nonpublic information.311  To be sure, nondisclosure and 
non-use “are logically distinct.”  In similar terms, receiving nonpublic 
information and keeping it that way is one thing – using it for personal 
benefit is another.312
Chief Judge Fitzwater next moved on to the linchpin of his 
reasoning, declaring that for misappropriation theory liability to be 
predicated upon an agreement, the understanding must include both the 
obligation to maintain confidentiality and a promise “not to trade on or 
otherwise use” the information gained from that confidence (the 
agreement on both points must be express or implied).
 
313
Crucial to its holding, the court further declared that “[a]bsent a 
duty not to use the information for personal benefit, there is no 
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 308. Id. at 724-25. 
 309. Id. at 725. 
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 313. Id. 
720 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
deception in doing so.”314  Continuing in that line of reasoning, it 
follows that there can be no deception from the unilateral and/or 
subjective belief of one side.315  The sides must have a meeting of the 
minds that the one so blessed with this nonpublic information will not 
trade the stock on that knowledge.316
Furthermore, Chief Judge Fitzwater offered an additional ground on 
which to buttress his reasoning.  The misappropriation theory, he 
explained, is designed to assure market integrity by deterring 
wrongdoers who would exploit their access to nonpublic information for 
personal profit.
 
317  That integrity is safeguarded when duties of 
nondisclosure and nonuse, which arise via agreement, are as vigorously 
enforced as those which flow from a fiduciary relationship.318
Next the court turned to the penultimate question raised by Cuban’s 
motion to dismiss, and addressed whether the SEC adequately alleged 
that the defendant had entered into an agreement sufficient to create the 
duty that was the necessary prerequisite to establish misappropriation 
theory liability.
 
319  Certainly, state common law could impose such a 
duty – assuming that Cuban and the corporation did in fact enter into an 
agreement, express or implied, that the former would refrain from 
disclosing the pendency of the PIPE offering, and that they had further 
stipulated that he would refrain from trading on that information.320
Ultimately, the district court concluded that the government’s 
complaint failed in that task.
 
321  In a brief but intensely factual analysis, 
Chief Judge Fitzwater took note of the precise words that the SEC 
alleged Cuban spoke in his crucial conversation with Mamma.com’s 
CEO.322  Cuban agreed to keep the information confidential, but he did 
not agree, overtly or implicitly, to refrain from trading or otherwise 
employing the information for personal gain.323
 
 314. Id. 
  Nevertheless, the failure 
to allege this key point was the fatal flaw in the Commission’s 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id.; see also United States. v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 317. Id. at 727 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997)). 
 318. Id. at 727. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at 728. 
 323. Id. at 717. 
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pleading.324
Furthermore, Chief Judge Fitzwater found that Cuban’s declaration 
that he was “screwed” and could not sell was a remonstration that 
“appears to express his belief . . . however, [it] cannot reasonably be 
understood as an agreement” to not to sell his shares.
 
325  More to that 
point, the court found the complaint bereft of any additional facts “that 
reasonably suggest that the CEO intended to obtain from Cuban an 
agreement to refrain from trading . . . as opposed to an agreement merely 
to keep [the information] confidential.”326
Notably, the court wholly rejected any notion that the allegations 
concerning the subjective beliefs of Mamma.com’s chairman could 
suffice to prevent dismissal of the complaint, repeating the earlier 
postulation that, outside an actual fiduciary relationship, a “mere 
unilateral expectation” of the source would never suffice to gel into a 
valid pact to abstain from trading on the information bestowed by the 
source upon the recipient.
 
327  In effect, sans agreement translated into 
sans liability under the misappropriation theory.328  With that, the 
district court reached its ultimate holding on the shortcoming of the 
SEC’s complaint against Cuban.329
Chief Judge Fitzwater then turned to further arguments pertaining 
to the government’s reliance upon Rule 10b-5-2(b)(1) to impose a 
cognizable duty upon Cuban.  The court immediately noted that the 
Commission’s rulemaking authority with regard to its antifraud provisos 
is strictly delimited to prohibiting “conduct that is manipulative or 
deceptive.”
 
330  The SEC cannot, by administrative fiat, make unlawful 
any conduct that does not fall into one of these categories.331  As such, 
and harkening back to the necessary components of an underlying 
agreement between the relevant parties, the court declared that the 
agency cannot, by rulemaking, impose liability where an agreement 
lacks the vital element of a promise to refrain from trading.332
 
 324. Id. 
  Again the 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997)). 
 332. Id. at 728-29. 
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court found “it is the undisclosed use of such information . . . that makes 
the conduct deceptive under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”333
As is proper, the Chief Judge first examined the Rule’s plain 
meaning.
 
334  After extensively parsing both the canons of the plain 
meaning doctrine and the Rule itself,335 the court revealed the 
provision’s irredeemable flaw.336  According to Chief Judge Fitzwater, 
the Rule incorrectly attempts to base misappropriation theory liability 
upon an agreement that lacks the essential obligation not to trade.  The 
text of the Rule works to preserve confidentiality, but otherwise fails to 
require an agreement to refrain from trading.337  Again taking great care 
to parse the dense text of the Rule, the Chief Judge nevertheless returned 
unchanged to his central thesis, that the omission of a nonuse element 
from the Rule rendered it unable to establish liability pursuant to the 
misappropriation theory.338  To permit liability otherwise would allow 
the regulators to exceed their administrative rulemaking powers, 
particularly as to proscribing deceptive conduct.339  Once more, the court 
came to the final conclusion that misappropriation theory liability comes 
from a deception stemming from the undisclosed use of confidential 
information to trade a stock for personal gain.340
Arriving at his final disposition of the case at hand, the Chief Judge 
dismissed the SEC’s complaint against the defendant, on the ground that 
the Commission had failed to allege that Cuban agreed not to trade his 
Mamma.com shares, and that the agency could not rely upon Rule 10b-
5-2(b)(1) as a basis for the imposition of liability.  As is typical in 
granting a motion for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the court granted the 
SEC a limited time in which to file an amended complaint.
 
341
 
 333. Id. at 729. 
  
Surprisingly, the agency did not avail itself of this usual option.  Instead, 
it decided to appeal, and that tale follows immediately below. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. at 729-30. 
 336. Id. at 730. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at 730-31. 
 339. Id. at 731. 
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B. A REVERSAL OF FORTUNE: CUBAN IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
Mark Cuban’s victory in the Northern District of Texas was short-
lived.  A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting 
in New Orleans, summarily reversed the court below, reinstated the 
SEC’s action, and, most importantly, insisted upon the commencement 
of discovery.342
Given our recounting above, of District Judge Fitzwater’s detailed 
factual analysis, we need not waste words as to the portions thereof 
repeated by the Fifth Circuit.  Writing for the panel, Circuit Judge 
Patrick E. Higginbotham
  This appellate decision is worthy of close examination. 
Whether it survives such scrutiny is yet another open question. 
343 opened by characterizing the instant case as 
“rais[ing] questions as to the scope of liability under the 
misappropriation theory of insider trading.”  Not one for holding the 
audience in suspense, the eminent jurist immediately declared that the 
Fifth Circuit was “[t]aking a different view from our able district court 
brother,” overturning the dismissal and directing that the reinstated case 
“must proceed to discovery.”344
Denominating as the SEC’s “core allegation” that Cuban received 
confidential information and then bound himself in an agreement to 
abstain from trading, the tribunal swiftly noted that the court below 
rejected the agency’s contention, finding instead that, “at most,” the 
government’s complaint alleged the existence of a confidentiality 
agreement, but not an agreement that Cuban would not transact in his 
shares.
 
345
 
 342. SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010). 
  The Fifth Circuit then articulated the standard of review to be 
employed – de novo – taking all well pleaded facts as true, and viewing 
 343. The other panelists were Circuit Judges Carolyn Dineen King and Emilio M. 
Garza. As is commonly known, both Judges Higgenbotham and Garza have, at various 
times, been considered strong contenders for elevation to the United States Supreme 
Court (Judge Garza in particular by recent administrations). See “Who Is Emilio M. 
Garza,” (October 2005), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/SupremeCourt/ 
story?id=1257663 (discussing consideration of Judge Garza for the Supreme Court by 
the first Bush administration); see also Linda Greenhouse, Vacancy on the Court; 
Brennan, Key Liberal, Quits Supreme Court, Battle for Seat Likely, N.Y. TIMES, July 
21, 1990, at A1 (discussing consideration of Judge Higginbotham for the Supreme 
Court by the first Bush administration). 
 344. Cuban, 620 F.3d at 552. 
 345. Id. at 552. 
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them in a light most favorable to the complainant.346
Judge Higginbotham then posited the “complementary theories” of 
the law of insider trading at issue here, that of the “classical theory” and 
the countervailing “misappropriation theory.”
 
347  Following a quick 
summary of the former, the court made the observation that there are “at 
least two important variations of the classical theory.”348  The first is the 
assumption of the role of a “temporary insider” by a nominal outsider, 
such as an accountant, lawyer or other professional entrusted with the 
entity’s confidences.349  The other is the nefarious “tipper/tippee” 
scenario, wherein the recipient of the nonpublic information inherits the 
insider’s duty to disclose or abstain from trading.350  Each of these 
“twists,” to use the court’s term, on the classical theory is firmly 
grounded upon the insider’s obligations to the corporation.351
This distinguishes the above variations from the thesis behind the 
misappropriation school of thought, first adopted by the Justices in 
O’Hagan.
 
352  Referring to that landmark, the Fifth Circuit reminds that 
the Supreme Court held therein that there is no generic duty between all 
market participants to abstain from trading when in possession of 
material, nonpublic information, rather, trading becomes violative when 
there is a breach of duty owed to the source of the data.353
The Fifth Circuit emphasized that that Supreme Court “did not set 
the contours of a relationship of trust and confidence” central to finding 
misappropriation liability.
 
354  Nonetheless, the tribunal found itself 
tasked with determining whether or not Cuban was in such a relationship 
here.  In endeavoring to do so, the panel diverged from the court below 
in reading the complaint.355
The tribunal duly noted the contention that Mamma.com’s CEO 
was instructed to convey to Cuban that the news he was about to hear 
 
 
 346. Id. at 553 (footnotes omitted). See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 347. Cuban, 620 F.3d at 553. (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 
(1997), United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
 348. Cuban, 620 F.3d at 554.  
 349. Id. at n.14 (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983)). 
 350. Id. at 555-56. 
  351. Id. at 554. 
 352. Id. at 556-57 (citing O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642). 
 353. Id. 
  354.     Id. at 555. 
 355. Id. at 557.  As point in fact, the Fifth Circuit explicitly noted that its differing 
interpretation of the SEC’s complaint relieved it of addressing the additional issues of 
the validity of Rule 10b-5-(2)(b)(1). Id. 
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was confidential, which led, to the defendant’s putative  “[w]ell, now 
I’m screwed” malediction.  Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit took 
cognizance of the allegation of the corporation’s chairman that 
management anticipated Cuban would be greatly angered after hearing 
of the contemplated PIPE deal, and thus they were unsurprised when he 
said he would dump his holdings.356
Here the panel shifted focus.  It honed in on Cuban’s subsequent 
telephone conversation with the corporation’s investment banker, where, 
in a supposed eight minute call, Cuban was given more detail on the 
anticipated PIPE offering. 
 
357  The Fifth Circuit then declared that “[i]t is 
a plausible inference that Cuban learned the off-market prices available 
to him and other PIPE participants.”358  And as we know, Cuban 
thereafter ordered his broker to sell off all his Mamma.com shares.  That 
call allegedly came a single minute after Cuban ended his call with the 
corporation’s banker.359  Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit also referred to 
the content of an email sent the next day by the corporation’s chairman 
to its board, wherein that gentleman implied that Cuban was prohibiting 
from selling his stock until after the PIPE was publicly announced.360
Emphasizing those distinguishing marks, and reading the complaint 
in the light most favorable to the government, the tribunal drew its own 
conclusions.  Specifically taking the “[w]ell, now I’m screwed” 
exclamation in isolation, the Fifth Circuit held that such an utterance 
“can plausibly be read” as evidence that Cuban believed he was indeed 
prohibited from selling his shares, but he in fact did not agree to do 
so.
 
361  However, the court continued, that all changed when Cuban 
learned the details of the upcoming PIPE transaction from the 
company’s investment banker – “Cuban requested the terms and 
conditions of the offering. . ..[and] [o]nly after Cuban reached out to 
obtain this additional information” did he order the liquidation of his 
stake.362
Judge Higginbotham then wrote that, “taken in their entirety,” the 
combined weight of these allegations “provide[s] more than a plausible 
 
 
 356. Id. at 558. 
 357. Id. at 556. 
 358. Id.  
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basis to find” that Cuban had knowingly and willingly entered into 
“more than a simple confidentiality agreement.”363  It was “at least 
plausible . . . if only implicitly,” that all concerned understood that 
Cuban could not act upon the more detailed information newly 
gained.364  Significantly, the Fifth Circuit held that it would need 
additional facts in order to conclude that “the parties could not plausibly 
have reached this shared understanding,” that is, Cuban was prohibited 
from trading.365
The panel now extended this thinking even further, and 
characterized Cuban’s supposed “keep confidential but free to sell” 
mindset as “in effect providing him an exclusive license to trade on the 
material, nonpublic information.”
 
366  And in a final blow, Judge 
Higgenbotham speculated that “perhaps Cuban mislead the CEO . . . in 
order to obtain a confidential look at the details of the PIPE,” but then 
swiftly added that on this “factually sparse record” there was an 
evenhanded plausibility that each and every player knew that trading 
was forbidden before the stock offering was publicly announced.367
In contradistinction, the circuit court noted only parenthetically 
Cuban’s countervailing allegation that Mamma.com’s managers 
deliberately forced information upon him, because they knew the PIPE 
was oversubscribed and it was their plan to thwart him from taking 
independent action.
 
368  The court declined to express an opinion on this 
dispute, on the grounds that procedure compelled a reading of all such 
controversies in favor of the government, as the party at risk of 
dismissal.369
In conclusion, the Fifth Circuit returned to one of the fundamental 
propositions behind its reversal of the district Court – that there is a 
“paucity” of jurisprudence on what constitutes a relationship of trust and 
confidence that must first exist for there to be liability pursuant to the 
 
 
 363. Id. 
  364. Id. 
  365. Id. 
  366. Id. at 557. 
 367. Id.  
  368. Id. at 558 n.37 
 369. Id. Another diversion, albeit also footnoted, was mention of the “serious 
tipper/tippee liability” that would attach if Mamma.com’s CEO had deliberately 
provided Cuban with a trading advantage in order to curry favor. To be sure, the panel 
said it was of course not suggesting any such impropriety, but justified this non sequitur 
as “simply reinforcing the plausibility” of any interpretation of the allegations that 
Cuban knew he was prohibited from trading. Id. at 558 n.38. 
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misappropriation theory.370  Embellishing the same with the finding that 
such inquiries are by necessity fact-intensive, the tribunal declined to 
“place [its] thumb on the scale” of such determinations, leaving that task 
to the district court in the first instance.371
Furthermore, the circuit court would not now draw the boundaries 
of what liability might attach until such fact-finding was complete.  
Given that decision to abstain from delineating the relevant bounds of 
the law, the Fifth Circuit vacated the lower court’s judgment of 
dismissal, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings – 
again with the explicit command that discovery must proceed on those 
precise issues.
 
372
C. REFLECTIONS ON CUBAN 
 
For now, Mark Cuban has been dealt a setback.  While the district 
court’s dismissal of the government’s charges awarded him the initial 
victory, the Fifth Circuit’s reversal reinstates the complaint, and allows 
the prosecutors to proceed.  Still, this most recent development is by no 
means the last word. 
At this stage, the appellate court has explicitly demanded discovery.  
What that discovery shall yield is, as of yet, uncertain.  At least in one 
respect, it does not look promising for the SEC.  It is hard to imagine 
what subset of allegations is still discoverable, and which allegations the 
agency did not incorporate into its pleading the first time.  Given the 
relatively compressed sequence of relevant events, what could there be 
to add?  This might explain why the regulators were so dead set on 
appealing the lower court’s dismissal, rather than taking the easier road 
that was so explicitly offered by the district judge, that of filing a revised 
complaint.  It could very well be that this is all the Commission has, thus 
explicating its rationale for fighting so doggedly for the right to proceed 
with its original complaint. 
Viewed in other ways, the putative defendant had to have some 
expectation of a similar outcome.  Cuban’s first victory was conditional, 
as the SEC had a right to replead.  Therefore, at a minimum, he logically 
had to anticipate that another run would be taken at him by the 
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prosecutors, in the form of an enhanced complaint.  That being said, the 
surprise is not that there is an extant complaint against Cuban, rather, it 
is that the original pleading was resuscitated, instead of being replaced 
altogether.  Moreover, as previously mentioned, if the upcoming 
discovery turns out to be as paltry as we might believe, then the SEC has 
already played its best hand, and is highly unlikely to have an ace up its 
regulatory sleeve.373
Supreme Court review could be the ultimate result for the parties, 
and at the same time potentially establish the 21st Century’s first 
precedent on the law of insider trading.  From the outset, Chief District 
Judge Fitzwater’s decision can be viewed as far more consonant with the 
holdings of Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan, in taking a more principled 
and cautious view of the scope of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  In 
sharp counterpoise, we see the Fifth Circuit’s holding to be more 
expansive in its application of the last three decades of precedents, and 
thus somewhat more adventuresome and therefore disturbing.  For the 
present, we leave the reader with this overview and return to it in greater 
detail later.  Having brought these cases to the present day, we turn now 
to our analysis of the state of the law of insider trading. 
  Furthermore, the circuit court’s reversal was 
clearly accommodating of further motion practice below, short of trial, 
most especially a prayer for summary judgment.  Once discovery is had, 
the opposing sides may find themselves in the same position they 
previously occupied before Chief District Judge Fitzwater –  that is, with 
Cuban the victor, and the Commission licking its wounds.  In sum, Mr. 
Cuban may not have a great deal to worry about just yet.  Taking any or 
all of the above, there are a number of conceivable outcomes that will 
award victory to Cuban.  However, we have saved the best for last. 
 
 
 373. Not surprisingly, Mr. Cuban and the SEC are proving to be just as litigious over 
discovery as they are over the substantive aspects of this matter. See Thom Weidlich, 
Mark Cuban Wins Access to Documents in Feud With SEC, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 22, 
2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-09-22/mark-cuban-wins-access-to-
documents-in-feud-with-sec.html.  See also Cuban v. SEC (09-cv-00996) (D.D.C. 
(memo op.) (September 22, 2010) (Walton, J.), available at http://docs.justia.com/ 
cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2009cv00996/136856/27/. 
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VIII. ANALYSIS  & COMMENTARY 
A. THE AXIOMS OF THE LAW OF INSIDER TRADING 
We now arrive at our analysis of all that has come before, a 
seemingly daunting task.  Thankfully, the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on the matter of insider trading holds clear and consistent 
threads of reasoning that has produced certain themes over the years. 
First, for decades the Justices have consistently struck a theme of 
focusing on the limitations of Section 10(b) liability, while concurrently 
delimiting the statute’s offspring, Rule 10(b)-5.  The pronouncements of 
the Court are legion, declaring time and again that the courts are bound 
to apply the text of the relevant provision only, and adamantly refusing 
to venture beyond its plain wording.  Firm in demarcating the 
boundaries of the originating statute, the Court is just as steadfast in 
restraining Rule 10(b)-5 within those same borders.  Even in the newest 
case of Morrison, where the Supreme Court’s prime goal was to restrict 
both statute and rule to transactions distinctly American in character, the 
Court vigorously exploited the opportunity to repeat and reaffirm the 
precepts of limitation (and, conversely, not expansion). 
Irrefutably then, the lesson to take to the present day is that Section 
10(b) liability is not lightly imposed.  Its entire history speaks of lawful 
application only to conduct that clearly falls within the sphere of 
prohibition.  After all, the Supreme Court has made it clear that Section 
10(b) should never be construed “so broadly as to convert every 
common-law fraud that happens to involve securities into a violation” of 
the statute.374
Second, the essence of the Chiarella holding, which remains as 
strong today as when it was decided thirty years ago, is that there must 
be a true fiduciary duty, and it must truly be breached, in order to incur 
Section 10(b) liability.  Chiarella’s precept that fiduciary duty arises 
from a specific relationship between the parties continues to be 
  What falls outside that zone, while neither necessarily fair 
nor pleasant in the transacting of the stock market, is nonetheless free 
from prosecution.  Indeed, this is a compelling factor to be taken into 
account as we analyze the evolution from Chiarella to the Cuban case 
today. 
 
 374. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002) (citing Marine Bank v. Weaver, 
455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982)). 
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reaffirmed in the present day.375
Often underappreciated in Chiarella is the great respect the Court 
demonstrated for the seminal administrative decision of the SEC in 
Cady, Roberts, where the Commission grounded its original maxim with 
a strong deference for the corporate relationships that give rise to 
fundamental fiduciary duties.  Chiarella is neither a departure nor an 
affront to the Commission’s thinking.  To be sure, it paid appropriate 
homage to the basic ties of fiduciary duty that bind directors, officers, 
and other traditional insiders to shareholders and the market.  It must be 
remembered that the Court in Chiarella did not condone the defendant’s 
actions, nor did the Justices void his conviction in a cavalier fashion.  
Much to the contrary, Mr. Chiarella escaped prosecution because the 
Court refused to venture beyond the well-defined bounds of the statute.  
The Court was most unwilling to stretch the law, and rightly so.  And if 
this resulted in an ignominious defeat that nettles the regulators to this 
day, so be it. 
 
Chiarella remains an unblemished cornerstone because it applied 
the law as written, and not as the government wished it was written.  It is 
that theme we have taken heed of for thirty years, and should abide by 
even now in the wake of Cuban.  And as for Dirks, we refer to it only 
briefly here.  It is both a reaffirmation of Chiarella and a precursor to 
the next evolution of insider trading doctrine.  As to the former, Dirks is 
but a continuation of Chiarella’s paramount inquiry as to the existence 
of a clear fiduciary duty.  Just like Chiarella, Dirks turned back the 
prosecution because that essential was lacking.  Once more, the Justices 
refused to construct a fiduciary duty where one did not already exist.  As 
to the forthcoming evolutionary phase, the Dirks Court was clearly not 
ready for the next step, but exhibited great restraint, not to mention 
foresight, to await its arrival. 
Third, it was the advent of O’Hagan that provided the timely and 
substantive next step in the natural growth of the law of insider trading.  
Indeed, O’Hagan more than justified the Court’s patience.  Just as 
Chiarella and Dirks had cemented the bonds of breach of fiduciary duty 
in the context of Section 10(b) liability, O’Hagan was the next and 
equally solid brick in the infrastructure, adding the final leg to the 
trilogy.  O’Hagan represented the Court’s long awaited opportunity to 
address the misappropriation theory of insider trading liability.  And as 
we have thus far demonstrated, it did not squander that opportunity.  
 
 375. Skilling v. United States, 30 S. Ct. 2896, 2930 (2010). 
2011] THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF  731 
THE LAW OF INSIDER TRADING 
Indeed, the Supreme Court seized the day, setting out its next, vital 
postulation. 
Our initial perception of the central theme of O’Hagan is that it is 
rather straightforward.  O’Hagan makes it explicit that misappropriation 
is a wrongful act, and subjects the malefactor to Section 10(b) liability.  
Indeed, in our view, few would argue that the Court equates 
misappropriation to outright thievery.  Therefore, to misappropriate the 
information, confidences or secrets of another is wrong, and to exploit 
these stolen goods for personal gain compounds the transgression.  That 
such malfeasance in connection with the purchase or sale of securities 
gives rise to Section 10(b) liability is a simple enough proposition. 
But we think the foregoing analysis runs the risk of constituting an 
oversimplification.  O’Hagan is in fact a much more nuanced approach 
to the issue.  We believe the Court’s conclusions go further than a 
simple finding that the misappropriation of material, nonpublic 
information gives rise to Section 10(b) liability.  Sharply consistent with 
Chiarella and Dirks, O’Hagan restores the breach of a fiduciary duty as 
a linchpin underlying the imposition of liability.  It is more than the act 
of misappropriation that the Court finds crucial.  It is the breach of a 
trusted relationship, motivated above all by personal profit that the Court 
ultimately finds determinative. 
Note that in O’Hagan the Justices did not cast the net far nor wide.  
O’Hagan sought to specifically ensnare those who not only 
misappropriated, but those who blatantly breached an unmistakable 
fiduciary duty in order to personally benefit.  Again, the commonality of 
themes is struck: 1) acquisition of another’s secrets; 2) breach of a duty 
to maintain confidentiality; and 3) personal profit-taking by breaching 
that solemn duty.  These themes arise not only from O’Hagan, but its 
predecessors Chiarella, Dirks, and their progeny in the intervening 
years. 
Fourth, we now impose this evolution of Section 10(b) liability 
upon the instant case of Cuban, where we find the district court’s 
opinion better reasoned and more in line with Supreme Court precedent.  
Indeed, Chief Judge Fitzwater exhibited sharp awareness of the Supreme 
Court precedents that bound him.  Take for example, how in his factual 
dissertation he subtly categorizes Cuban as certainly not a traditional 
insider in the Cady, Roberts mold, nor as a confidante, as found in 
O’Hagan.  The implication is that the actor in Cuban is more closely 
aligned with those wrongfully accused in Chiarella and Dirks; 
732 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
knowledgeable, but not truly inside. 
As to the limits of Section 10(b) liability, the district court opinion 
in Cuban carefully stays within the contours mapped out by Chiarella, 
and later Dirks, and carefully distinguishes itself from the conduct 
proscribed in O’Hagan.  The district court does not wander aimlessly 
outside the carefully constructed walls of Rule 10(b)-5 liability, looking 
for a result.  Rather, it avoids all such peradventure, confining itself to 
asking whether the accusations made, if indeed true, fall within the 
purview of Section 10(b)’s prohibited conduct.  Finding that they do not, 
Chief District Judge Fitzwater announced a result that is consistent with 
the statutory text, the scope of the agency rule, and Supreme Court 
precedent.  For these reasons, we would have preferred that his finding 
had remained unaltered. 
B. “WELL, NOW I’M SCREWED.  I CAN’T SELL.” 
First, we ask forgiveness for highlighting the foregoing crudity.  
We find refuge in the unassailable fact that it is (purportedly) a direct 
quote of Mr. Cuban, and has already been memorialized in both the 
Federal Supplement 2d and the Federal Reporter 3d by the august 
tribunals of the Northern District of Texas and the Fifth Circuit, 
respectively.  But emphasize it we must, for in our considered opinion, it 
is the proverbial “smoking gun” in the instant case, and, more to the 
point, this holding has massive implications for the future of the law of 
insider trading.   
These seven words are the pivot upon which two federal courts 
turned, but in polar opposite directions.  Chief District Judge Fitzwater 
interpreted them as a declarative that, at most, committed Mr. Cuban to 
an agreement to keep confidential what he had just learned about 
Mamma.com’s PIPE offering.  Notably, the learned district judge did 
not find that this excited utterance bound Mr. Cuban to any further 
obligation to the company, its shareholders or the market at large. 
In sharp contrast, the Fifth Circuit assigned the terse expletive a 
wholly different interpretation, or at the very least implied as much.  
Writing for the panel, Circuit Judge Higginbotham subscribed to the 
SEC’s notion that, by these few words, Mr. Cuban did in fact commit 
not to trade on what he had learned, and thereafter bound himself not to 
trade his shares evermore (or at least until the PIPE deal was made 
public).  This is much more than the district court concluded as to what 
Mr. Cuban agreed to by way of his rejoinder to the company’s 
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representatives, and adds a whole new dimension to what the lower 
court concluded was but an implied vow to do one thing (maintain 
confidentiality), but not necessarily the other (abstain from trading). 
We are most troubled by the Fifth Circuit’s additional gloss on the 
putative defendant’s words.  Taken at face value, it is beyond cavil that 
Mr. Cuban’s declaration, obviously made in an agitated state, certainly 
does not contain the words like “promise,” “agree,” or the like.  Nor can 
any such words of commitment be sensibly implied from his excited 
retort.376
Certainly, we do not mean to suggest that the SEC could only 
prevail if Mr. Cuban made a formal or outright statement that he agreed 
not to trade his shares upon hearing news of the PIPE offering.  We 
agree it would be outlandish here, and for cases in the years to come, to 
require the government to offer proof that an alleged wrongdoer had 
entered in such an overt agreement to refrain from trading.  Such a 
notion is unfounded under our law and, if it actually became established, 
would do incalculable damage to the laws prohibiting insider trading.  
To be entirely clear, we would never advocate extending such carte 
blanche to potential stock market tricksters. 
 
While we make clear that which is not required, we now clarify 
what is required of regulatory accusers in insider trading cases – that 
which we believe the Fifth Circuit was all too ready to find or even 
supply itself.  Where in the choice words of Mr. Cuban do we find 
unequivocal words of accord, unequivocal words of understanding or 
unequivocal words of acquiescence?  Where is there at least some 
semblance of the putative defendant’s commitment to a certain course of 
action?  What can even be justly implied from so few words, more than 
likely shouted into a telephone in a fit of frustration?  Is it too much to 
 
 376. We need not even fortify our contention by exploring the fact that Mr. Cuban 
has a history of making such robust, reactionary statements, very few of which are 
legally significant, although some of them have proven expensive. See, e.g., ESPN.com 
NEWS, NBA Fines Cuban $200K for Antics On, Off Court, (May 11, 2006), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/playoffs2006/news/story?id=2440355 (describing fine for 
comments made during 2006 NBA playoff series versus in-state rival San Antonio 
Spurs, and further noting Cuban was fined for more than $1 million by the league in his 
first two years as principal owner of the Dallas Mavericks); STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS 
BUSINESS DAILY, NBA Fines Mark Cuban $100,000 For Comments About LeBron 
James, (May 24, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/139521 (comments 
about then-upcoming free agency of megastar LeBron James deemed to violate NBA 
anti-tampering rules). 
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ask the regulators, even at the pleading stage, to offer some evidence of 
more substantially damning words of agreement? 
Regrettably, that which we humbly suggest we should find, we do 
not.  Try as we might, we find nothing clear, nothing suggestive nor 
even something implying that the putative defendant made known that 
he would refrain from any course of action.  Similarly, we find lacking 
any temporal element that constricted Mr. Cuban’s options or the ability 
to change his mind as he saw fit. We would have far less of a dispute 
(and much less to write about) if such existed in the instant case, and the 
Fifth Circuit employed the same foundation for allowing the government 
to reinstate its complaint. 
To be clear, we respectfully differ with the Fifth Circuit in the 
following additional aspects of its decision.  While the panel 
unhesitatingly acknowledges the Supreme Court’s remonstration that 
there is no generalized duty between all market participants to abstain 
from trading, we sense that it draws an erroneous conclusion from that 
principle.  In Cuban, the opinion as cast by Judge Higginbotham utilizes 
the rule of “no generalized duty” as a launching point for a larger 
imposition of liability, without specific guidelines.  We would contend, 
quite to the contrary, that the Supreme Court’s declaration that a generic 
obligation does not exist compels the lower courts to impose liability 
only for specified actions that fall well within the boundaries of 
prohibited conduct. 
To say that “no general duty” leads to more, not less, liability 
misses the mark made by the Supreme Court in the seminal insider 
trading cases.  The jurisprudence to date is given a far more principled 
application when interpreted to mean that the absence of a generalized 
duty delimits the imposition of liability to reasonably precise and 
ascertainable conduct.  Given the vagaries of Mr. Cuban’s 
denouncement, would it not be a more principled verdict to find him 
falling within the far wider category of those without a generalized 
obligation not to trade in these matters? 
Similar thoughts abound with regard to the Fifth Circuit’s holding 
that O’Hagan and the like did not stake out the specific metes and 
bounds of what constitutes a relationship of trust and confidence for 
purposes of applying the misappropriation theory.  Our difference of 
opinion is based upon the question of whether lacking set borders, it is 
wise to draw them in a case that turns upon statements unquestionably 
made in anger, lacking clarity of purpose, and subject to divergent 
interpretations.  Crafting the boundaries of a “confidential relationship” 
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in the context of Section 10(b) liability for insider trading must be an 
exercise in caution and circumspection.377
No doubt it would be helpful for the lower courts to formulate the 
contours of this essential relationship, subject to the oversight of the 
Supreme Court.  But the ambiguity of what we find here counsels 
restraint.  The instant set of facts is far from ideal for setting a precedent 
on such an important issue.  Again, we would suggest that not imposing 
liability on these contentious facts is the better outcome, as we patiently 
await a case more suitable for principled decision-making.  In short, the 
Fifth Circuit declares there is a “paucity” of jurisprudence on this key 
question.  We agree.  But if so, then why the rush to resolve it today?  
That is a key element of our disagreement with the appellate court’s 
recent decision. 
  We only wish the Fifth 
Circuit had evidenced more of these qualities in making its decision in 
Cuban. 
On a more factual level, we are troubled that the Fifth Circuit seems 
to put a fair amount of stock in what persons other than Mr. Cuban said 
or thought.  For example, consider the email sent by Mamma.com’s 
chairman to its board, reporting on the interactions with the angered 
investor.  Essentially, this is nothing but a summary, made by a 
corporate chieftain no doubt fully occupied with, the upcoming stock 
offering, placating his largest individual investor, and a multitude of 
other potential corporate matters.  These are muddy waters to be sure, 
and the chair’s recitation, in truth, does nothing to clarify what Mr. 
Cuban said, much less what he committed to.  Yet the panel took due 
note of it, and clearly gave the email a certain amount of credence in 
formulating its ratio decendi that Mr. Cuban had somehow promised to 
refrain from trading. 
 
 377. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1991), where the 
erudite Second Circuit declared that “[m]ore than a perfunctory nod at the rule of lenity, 
then, is required” in such instances, and further warning that “an elastic and expedient 
definition of confidential relations…has no place in the criminal law” aspect of section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, lest we offend, not only the rule of lenity, but due process as 
well. And to set aside any doubts about the modern Supreme Court’s fidelity to the rule 
of lenity, see Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2935-36 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part, and concurring in the judgment), wherein Justice Scalia called for 
the out and out voiding of section 1346 of title 18, the federal criminal code, the so-
called “theft of honest services” prohibition, for its constitutional infirmities when cast 
against the rule of lenity. See also Anthony Michael Sabino, The U.S. Supreme Court 
and Business: The Year in Review, 25 CORP. COUNS. 1 (Oct. 2010) (analyzing Skilling). 
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Furthermore, why does the panel hypothesize, among other things, 
that Mr. Cuban might have been serving his own avarice by speaking to 
the company’s investment banker, with his goal being to glean more 
details about the PIPE offering?  That is rank speculation as to his 
motivations and intentions, frankly made more egregious because it is 
made on an admittedly weak factual record.378
Nearing the conclusion to its decision, the tribunal candidly admits 
that it was confronted by a sparse record.  If indeed the record was so 
barren, was it not the proper role of the appellate court to defer to the 
facts that were already found in at least some detail by the chief district 
judge?  Should not the Fifth Circuit have stopped its inquiries right 
there?  Was affording the government an opportunity to return with a 
better fortified set of allegations of conduct violative of Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5, not Chief District Judge Fitzwater’s overt purpose in 
dismissing with leave to replead? 
  Notwithstanding that the 
opinion backs off those ruminations in the very next breath, we 
respectfully suggest that the damage is already done.  We find that the 
mere expression of such thoughts betray an erroneous approach by the 
panel. 
Furthermore, the panel postulates that it will need more facts to 
conclude that the parties “could not plausibly have reached this shared 
understanding” that Mr. Cuban had agreed not to trade in his shares.  
Yet is this not seeking to prove a negative?  We might be misreading 
this, but quite possibly we are interpreting the court’s intentions 
precisely.  If the latter, we are deeply troubled that the tribunal demands 
facts to prove that an agreement did not exist between these actors. 
In our considered view, all the above leads to this salient point – the 
Fifth Circuit steadfastly refused to find the lower court’s interpretations 
to provide reasonably plausible explanations of the actions of Mr. 
Cuban.  It insists that the search continue for an explication that it will 
deem reasonable and plausible, and then takes quite a bit of time to 
speculate on what it will find acceptable. 
 
 378. Mr. Cuban must indeed be feeling persecuted these days. Most recently, he was 
mentioned, but not accused of any wrongdoing, for selling his 5.4% stake in Lions Gate 
Entertainment Corp. to fellow billionaire (and takeover artist deluxe) Carl Icahn, as part 
of Icahn’s ongoing battle for control of movie studio Lions Gate and the legendary 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. (“MGM”) studios. Icahn Accused in Lions Gate Suit of 
Plotting Merger, MONEY NEWS, (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.moneynews.com/ 
FinanceNews/Icahn-Lions-Gate-Plotting-Merger/2010/10/29/id/375269.  In addition, 
the iconic MGM recently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.   
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Why does this tribunal stand fast against bestowing the status of 
reasonable plausibility to the conclusions reached by its distinguished 
brethren below?  What else does it want?  And is it fair to hypothesize 
again and again as to what it might deem passes muster?  We find all of 
this difficult to deal with, especially in the context of principled 
decision-making in the contorted matter of insider trading liability. 
 To be sure, we comprehend that discovery may resolve our 
doubts in this matter, and that is, at least in part, a proper justification for 
the appellate bench to return the controversy to the lower court.  
Nonetheless, we find it troubling that the Fifth Circuit would reverse the 
district court’s dismissal on its contrary view of such de minimis 
evidence as Mr. Cuban’s ill-advised seven words. 
Again, in our view the better outcome would have been to affirm 
the dismissal, and compel the government to tread the path originally 
offered by Chief District Judge Fitzwater, that of repleading the 
complaint, and returning to the trial court upon a firmer footing. 
We are troubled that the Fifth Circuit made a far more permissive 
holding as to the government’s burden.  The appeals court read more 
into those seven words, a great deal more, and, we respectfully contend, 
without just cause.  In doing so, not only did the tribunal authorize the 
government to reinstitute this proceeding, but its expansive view of the 
requirements to sustain a Section 10(b) case flies in the face of the far 
more constrained view of insider trading prosecutions that the Supreme 
Court has long imposed. 
We respectfully believe that in order to sustain this or any future 
prosecution for insider trading, the SEC should surmount a higher bar 
than the circuit court has set here.  We assert that, this has been the 
mandate of the Supreme Court since 1980 with the promulgation of 
Chiarella, and little or no retreat from the standard so established some 
thirty years ago.  But now the Fifth Circuit has transformed the 
prerequisites of a Section 10(b) prosecution into something far less 
demanding of the government, a result with which we respectfully 
cannot agree. 
To be sure, we are not quibbling over mere semantics with regard to 
the putative defendant’s comments, which are so central to the 
prosecution here.  We would not demean the law by playing word games 
with Section 10(b) nor its companion Rule 10b-5 – without argument the 
two most vital tools in vigorous securities law enforcement.  But far 
more is at stake here. 
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C. THE LAW AS IT MUST BE 
Having catalogued above our manifold complaints as to how the 
Fifth Circuit adopted, what we contend to be, a distorted view of the 
facts as pleaded by the government in Cuban, and thereafter intensified 
said distortion with an equally myopic view of the law, we must 
conclude by focusing, with vigor, on that panel’s interpretation (or, 
better said, misinterpretation) of the bedrock cases defining liability for 
insider trading 
First, examining the seminal decision of Chiarella, it is our opinion 
that the Fifth Circuit did not take heed of the Supreme Court’s 
admonition that not everyone is a fiduciary who is thus prohibited from 
trading when knowledgeable about a certain corporate stock.  As the 
Court set out in Chiarella, and has harkened back to again and again in 
the thirty years since, mere possession of material, nonpublic 
information is not egregious, and, depending upon the actor, acting upon 
that knowledge is not necessarily violative of the law. 
Second, we apply the lessons of Dirks to the instant case of Cuban.  
Dirks rightfully avoided sanction because, in part, there was nothing 
improper as to how he was provided with the material, nonpublic 
information that he later disseminated.  We respectfully contend that the 
tribunal failed to give credit in Cuban for that same circumstance.  Both 
of the accused in the respective cases were voluntarily informed by 
others and they did not seek out the knowledge (we limit ourselves to 
the initial revelations voluntarily made to Dirks).  Then why did the 
Fifth Circuit not render in Cuban the same protection thus afforded to 
the defendant by the Supreme Court in Dirks?  That is indeed a 
troublesome difference. 
Third, and conceivably of tremendous import for today and the days 
to come, why did the Fifth Circuit in Cuban apparently not heed the 
robust warning of the dangers of unbridled prosecutorial power 
enunciated in Dirks?  The Dirks Court decried the hazard of loosely 
applied statutory prohibitions, and the damage they could wreak in the 
hands of an overzealous government.  For that reason, the Court 
explicitly rejected the SEC’s approach in that case.  Why was this stern 
caution not given greater respect by the Cuban panel?  And would not 
such deference to the prosecution in the Fifth Circuit lead to further 
appeasement to government power in the First Circuit, the Second 
Circuit, and seriatim, until the safeguards against regulatory 
overreaching posited by Dirks are as easily circumvented as the Maginot 
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Line? 
Fourth, and consonant with the above, the Justices in Dirks heavily 
emphasized that Section 10(b) liability can only be rightfully judged on 
“objective criteria.”  We find the SEC’s case in Cuban to be fatally 
flawed, precisely because it cannot meet this absolute prerequisite.  The 
regulators bet everything on the perception of Mr. Cuban’s memorable 
telephonic utterances.  The evidence proffered by the Commission defies 
objective measurement – quite to the contrary, it is very subjective 
evidence, open to vastly differing interpretations. 
But such missteps do not stop with the regulators in the case at bar.  
The Fifth Circuit gave credence to, among other things, what Chief 
District Judge Fitzwater explicitly characterized as the subjective belief 
of Mamma.com’s chairman in that individual’s interactions with the 
accused.  Yet Dirks does not merely ask, it commands the lower courts 
to consider the objective facts presented by the prosecution.  To us, the 
Fifth Circuit’s failure to observe this edict does violence to the very 
basic requirements mandated by the Supreme Court in insider trading 
cases. 
Unfortunately, this is not a flaw easily remedied.  The failure to 
apply the bright line tests for insider trading liability, as mandated by the 
Supreme Court for decades, leads to the unavoidable and equally 
undesirable outcome of unprincipled decision-making.  Chiarella, and 
Dirks in particular, strove to steer the courts away from such calamities.  
To swerve away from such hallowed landmarks, be it now in Cuban or 
later in other cases, is folly.379
The paramount lesson of Chiarella and Dirks, the early and seminal 
 
 
 379. Momentarily playing devil’s advocate, permit us to invoke O’Hagan, as the last 
component of this all-important trilogy of the law of insider trading. Note that O’Hagan 
stipulates that if the recipient of material, nonpublic information makes a full disclosure 
to the source of the information that the former intends to act upon what she knows, 
then all deception is negated, and with it all liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997). Now, to be very sure, we 
candidly admit that Cuban did not precisely disclose his intent to sell to Mamma.com’s 
principals. Then again, the factual record as developed by Chief District Judge 
Fitzwater, compels us to conclude that he never promised he would not sell. Cuban’s 
excited utterance that he “can’t sell” is, again in our humble opinion, absolutely not 
equivalent to an agreement not to sell. See SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 717-18, 
728 (N.D. Tex. 2009).  Here, we are not so sure as to where this specific point leads, but 
we assert is it compelling, and at least merits some attention as possibly deflating the 
government’s case against Mr. Cuban. 
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cases in the field, is that the government cannot proscribe conduct at its 
whim.  The regulators are tasked with finding violations by means of 
clear evidence, and pursuant to rational, principled interpretations of the 
controlling statute and rule made within their textual proscriptions, but 
not beyond.  By ascribing a more far-ranging perspective to Mr. Cuban’s 
excited utterances, and implicitly, the law that is being employed to 
judge, the Fifth Circuit has given the SEC dangerously broad latitude to 
prosecute on evidence that is flimsy at best.  In sum, this does not bode 
well for the future, in this case or for prosecutions yet to come. 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Insider trading is the stuff of high drama, both in real life and in 
fiction.  It captures our attention with its high profile participants, 
accusations of stock market skullduggery, calls for justice by outraged 
prosecutors and regulators, and attention grabbing headlines when these 
cases reach court.  While we have  taken great advantage of the notoriety 
of these cases here, we likewise gladly return to their legal essentials 
because, after all, that is all that really matters. 
History has proven that Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5 are truly the 
primary weapons in the continuing fight against wrongdoing in the stock 
market.  Nonetheless, even the most well intended weapon, if wielded 
unwisely, will do more harm than good.  Therefore, the Supreme Court 
has wisely delimited the reach of these two deterrents to their strict 
statutory texts.  In doing so, the Court has rightly kept their powers in 
check, so they do only justice, not harm. 
Concomitantly, the Court has fashioned a set of further protections, 
centered mainly around the Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan triumvirate 
of clarifying and enabling just decision-making.  The first two properly 
confine Section 10(b) to actual breaches of true fiduciary duty, while the 
last necessarily encompasses the wrong of misappropriation and metes 
out well-deserved punishment.  Thematic in each, is the Court’s 
emphasis on strict statutory interpretation, reliance upon well-
established boundaries of fiduciary duty, and the authorization of 
sanctions only when the wrongdoing fits well inside the statutory 
prohibition. 
As we now look at today’s Cuban case, we find ourselves in 
agreement with the position espoused by the district court, and 
concerned for the future with what the Fifth Circuit’s reversal portends.  
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That being so, we can only hope for some corrective holding in the days 
to come.  Looking to the future, we wonder if Cuban is the rightful heir 
to the logic and reasoning of Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan.  Will it be 
the extension of that trilogy or merely a misguided diversion from the 
law’s true course?  Nothing less than the future of the law of insider 
trading liability pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5 hangs in the 
balance.380
 
 
 
 380. And make no mistake, there is a bright and busy future for insider trading and 
prosecutions of it.  Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York, whose district is considered the epicenter of such crime, stridently declared that 
insider trading is rampant on Wall Street, and his office is “devot[ing] significant 
resources” to eradicate it.  Jonathan Dienst, Insider Trading ‘Rampant’ On Wall St.: 
U.S. Attorney, NBC NEW YORK, (Oct. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Insider-Trading-Rampant-On-Wall-St-US-
Attorney-105399138.html. As this Article went to press, the government had launched 
an all-out offensive against alleged insider trading, raiding hedge fund offices. See 
Patricia Hurtado & Saijel Kishan, Level Global, Diamondback Funds Searched by FBI 
Agents, BLOOMBERG, (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-
22/diamondback-capital-s-offices-in-connecticut-searched-by-fbi-agency-says.html 
(pursuing Wall Street traders); Adam Shell, Crackdown on Insider Trading Enters ‘New 
Phase,’ USA TODAY, Nov. 26, 2010, at 1B. The government even reached across the 
Atlantic Ocean to ensnare a former partner of a “Big Four” accounting firm for 
allegedly supplying material, nonpublic information about pending merger and 
acquisition activity of his hi-tech clients to overseas relatives for the purpose of buying 
up stock sub rosa.  See Marcy Gordon, Ex-Deloitte Partner Charged With Insider 
Trading, USA TODAY, Dec. 1, 2010, at 2B.   
